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Abstract
Poverty and inequality in Bolivia have reduced to a great extent in the last 20 years in
Bolivia. There are mixed opinions regarding the role of the state in this overall positive
result, and consistent evidence of state intervention is still missing. This dissertation aims
to explore the topic of the impact of government intervention on inequality and poverty
from three different perspectives.
In the first chapter, I frame the theoretical framework and set the research questions
of each of the chapters of the dissertation. In the second chapter, I examine the impact
of a policy experiment in Bolivia in 2007/2008, in which the payment method of a cash
transfer changed from a yearly lump sum to monthly installments. Both amounts do
not differ if we take them in full, but the change in the payment method could have an
impact given inherent behavior-specific constraints like lack of control of expenditures,
propensity to overspend and inability to save regularly. I am interested in the effects that
this policy change might have had on educational outcomes when the outcomes of those
affected by the policy change are compared with those who were not affected. Results
show an increase in attendance (around three percentage points) and a decrease in child
labor (by eight percentage points) for older children (attending secondary school). The
results are fairly robust to the use of different specifications. This suggests that a smaller
but more regular, constant in time and predictable flow of cash transfers can be preferable
to a once-a-year significant lump-sum transfer.
In Chapter 3, I evaluate the impact of increased fiscal decentralization on outcomes
as nutrition, access to safe water and sanitation in Bolivia during the 2000s decade. The
results show that fiscal decentralization has not increased the access of the population
to safe water or sanitation. Meanwhile, nutritional status of children less than five years
old has slightly improved during the study period, suggesting a positive impact of in-
creased decentralization on nourishment indicators. The inclusion of other dimensions of
decentralization policy (like administrative decentralization and the role of political in-
stitutions) are also analyzed, showing important interactions with fiscal decentralization.
On the other hand, decentralization does not appear to be pro-poor, as the results show
that the progress on nourishment indicators was more considerable in non-poor munici-
palities versus poor municipalities. These results are robust to different thresholds and
deprivation measures.
In the last chapter of the dissertation, I study the topic of horizontal inequality.
Horizontal inequality refers to the difference in income (or another welfare indicator) due
to membership in a specific group (e.g., determined, by race, gender, location, etc.). This
difference could be relevant in a context in which particular groups have been historically
excluded, as the case of indigenous people in Bolivia. In this chapter, a tax-benefit
incidence analysis model is used to assess the role of net public transfers on horizontal
inequality in Bolivia for the year 2015. The group categories that are subject of the
analysis are defined by ethnic status, gender, and location, besides a combination of these
categories. Results show that the most significant group inequality is observed when the
indigenous status is defined using an ethnolinguistic metric. However, the role of self-
identification in determining indigenous status is less important in explaining the income
gap. While the fiscal system seems to be progressive for indigenous and urban/rural
categories, this progressivity is not present when the gender dimension is assessed.
xii
Zusammenfassung
Armut und Ungleichheit in Bolivien haben sich in den letzten zwanzig Jahren in großem
Umfang verringert. Es bestehen unterschiedliche Meinungen u¨ber die Rolle des Staates
bei diesen insgesamt positiven Ergebnissen, durchga¨ngige Belege fu¨r staatliches Eingrei-
fen fehlen bisher. Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist die Untersuchung der Auswirkungen
staatlichen Eingreifens auf Ungleichheit und Armut aus drei unterschiedlichen Perspekti-
ven. Im ersten Kapitel werden der theoretische rahmen und die Forschungsfragen fu¨r die
einzelnen Kapitel der Dissertation festgelegt.
Im zweiten Kapitel wird Auswirkung eines Versuchs in Bolivien im Zeitraum von
2007 bis 2008 untersucht, bei dem die U¨berweisung von Bargeld von einer ja¨hrlichen
Auszahlung des Gesamtbetrages zu monatlichen Abschlagszahlungen umgestellt wurde.
Insgesamt bestand kein Unterschied in der Ho¨he der ausgezahlten Gelder, der Auszah-
lungsmodus ko¨nnte jedoch in Anbetracht von verhaltensspezifischer Einschra¨nkungen,
wie dem Mangel an Kontrolle bei Ausgaben, der Tendenz zur Mittelu¨berschreitung, und
der Unfa¨higkeit zu regelma¨ßigem Sparen. Besonderes Interesse gilt den mo¨glichen Effek-
ten der Maßnahmen auf Bildungsergebnisse, wenn sie mit dem Ergebnis von Individuen
verglichen werden, die nicht von den Maßnahmen betroffen waren. Die Ergebnisse zeigen
eine Zunahme bei Schulbesuchen (ungefa¨hr drei Prozent) und ein Absinken der Kinder-
arbeit (um acht Prozent) bei a¨lteren Kindern (die weiterfu¨hrende Schulen besuchen). Die
Ergebnisse lassen sich stabil mit unterschiedlichen Spezifikationen verwenden. Dies deu-
tet darauf hin, dass eine kleinere, konstantere und voraussehbarere Bargeldtransfers einer
ja¨hrlichen Auszahlung des Gesamtbetrages vorzuziehen sind.
Im dritten Kapitel bewerte ich die Auswirkungen von zunehmender fiskalischer De-
zentralisierung auf Indikatoren wie Erna¨hrung, Zugang zu Trinkwasser und Hygiene in
Bolivien in der ersten Dekade der 2000er Jahre. Die Erna¨hrungssituation von Kindern
unter fu¨nf Jahren hat sich im Untersuchungszeitraum leicht verbessert, was darauf hindeu-
tet, dass eine zunehmende Dezentralisierung positive Auswirkungen positive Auswirkun-
gen auf Erna¨hrungsindikatoren hat. Andere Dimensionen einer Dezentralisierungspolitik
(die Dezentralisierung der Verwaltung und die Rolle von politischen Institutionen) werden
ebenso analysiert, die wichtige Interaktionen einer fiskalischen Dezentralisierung aufzei-
gen. Dezentralisierung erscheint jedoch nicht pro-Armut zu sein, da die Ergebnisse zeigen,
dass die Verbesserung in nicht-armen Gemeinden gro¨ßer war als in armen Gemeinden.
Diese Ergebnisse sind bei unterschiedlichen Grenzwerten und Entziehungsmaßnahmen
stabil.
Im letzten Kapitel untersuche ich das Thema der horizontalen Ungleichheit. Horizon-
tale Ungleichheit bezieht sich auf Einkommensunterschiede (oder auf andere Wohlfahrt-
sindikatoren) aufgrund der Zugeho¨rigkeit zu einer spezifischen Gruppe (die z.B. durch die
Rasse, das Geschlecht oder den Standort bestimmt werden). Dieser Unterschied ko¨nnte in
einem Kontext relevant sein, in dem bestimmte Gruppen historisch angeschlossen wurden,
in diesem Fall die indigene Bevo¨lkerung Boliviens. Ein Analysemodell u¨ber Vorkommen
von Steuervorteilen wird angewandt, um die Rolle von o¨ffentlichen Transferleistungen
auf die horizontale Ungleichheit in Bolivien in 2015 zu bestimmen. Die Gruppenkate-
gorien, die in dieser Analyse untersucht werden, werden nach ethnischem Status, Ge-
schlecht, Standort sowie eine Kombination dieser Kategorien ermittelt. Die Ergebnisse
zeigen, dass die gro¨ßte Ungleichheit beim indigenen Status vorliegt, der anhand einer
xiii
ethno-linguistischen Metrik bestimmt wird. Die Selbstidentifikation zur Bestimmung des
indigenen Status ist jedoch weniger wichtig, um Einkommensunterschiede zu erkla¨ren.
Wa¨hrend das Fiskalsystem fu¨r die Kategorien Indigen und Urban/Land progressiver zu
sein scheinen, scheint dies bei der Untersuchung der Gender-Dimension nicht vorhanden
zu sein.
xiv
CHAPTER
ONE
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
1.1 Background
Poverty and inequality in Bolivia have declined dramatically in the last 20 years. The
International Financial Institutions (World Bank, IMF and regional investment banks)
have acknowledged that the country achieved success pulling-out thousands of people out
of poverty, halving the proportion of poor people from 2006 to 2016 (Vargas and Garriga,
2015). In the same line, the current government claims that it reduced inequality based on
a combination of aggressive social policy while maintaining prudent fiscal management.
It also seems clear that part of this success was based on the favorable external conditions,
in specific the so-called “super cycle” of commodities’ prices (Erten and Ocampo, 2013;
Erdem and U¨nalmıs¸, 2016). It is plausible then that the success in reducing poverty and
inequality was the result of sustained economic growth in the last ten years, in which
the country grew continuously, at rates between 3,4% (2009, in the midst of the global
financial crisis) and 6,8% (2013).
While the growth in Bolivia has been strong, there are some challenges that the
country has to face to achieve long-term development. For example, maternal mortality
is among the highest in the region (World Health Organization and UNICEF, 2014). In
a related area, under-nutrition remains as one of the pressing issues concerning human
capital formation. A recent report (IFPRI, 2017) have mentioned the lack of progress
of the country (compared to other neighbors in the region) about hunger reduction.
The disparities in the access to basic services (safe water and sanitation) between urban
and rural areas might exacerbate this challenge. This is a problem in the development
prospect of the country, as health status is a crucial determinant of future earnings,
through its influence on the cognitive abilities of children (Bourguignon and Walton,
2007). Health issues harm the perspective of future earnings for the youth and adults,
potentially creating a poverty-trap difficult to avoid.
Another area of concern is education. A great amount of resources out of the com-
modities’ super-cycle have been spent in increasing education infrastructure. In addition,
one of the most important conditional cash-transfer programs in the country is aimed to
increase the enrollment rate of students in public schools. However, while infrastructure
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is a necessary condition for improving the education, a change in focus towards a higher
quality of education is required, and so more policy actions in this direction are needed.
In addition, a recent report by the World Bank (de Hoyos et al., 2016) refers to the prob-
lem of the “ni-nis” generation: youth aged 15 to 24 years old that are not in school nor
working1. One of the characteristics of the “ni-nis” is that they have dropped-out school,
perhaps with the hope of earning a revenue to support their families. However, the job
that an inexperienced and under-qualified youth could be able to get will be unstable
and poor-paid. In the event of a negative shock, they will be back to unemployment
and can be very difficult (or even impossible) for them to join school again. In this
sense, this event could trigger a similar poverty-trap, affecting their lifetime income and
productivity.
A combination of failure in education and health in certain stages of life (early in the
case of health, and for education in the transition from the school to the job market or
tertiary education) could challenge the country’s profile for growth, potentially generating
poverty and inequality traps (Bourguignon and Walton, 2007). This last is defined as
a permanent state in which the most disadvantaged lack access to education, health,
and economic opportunities. The persistence of inequality avoids social mobility and
accumulation of wealth and human capital. This restriction can be deeply rooted in
highly unequal societies, due to racial, religious or ethnic motivations, as well as other
dimensions (e.g., gender, location).
Among policymakers and academia, there seems to be a consensus of the critical
role that the state plays to prevent people falling into spirals of permanent poverty and
inequality. It is accepted that the state should be a key actor in the developmental process
(Acemoglu et al., 2015), taking its role as public goods provider, externalities’ solver and
as a guarantor of private property (Finan et al., 2015). In this sense, a way to achieve
development is to conceive the state as a facilitator for the access of the population to
basic goods and services like health and education. Then, we should aim for more efficient
governments that tackle the necessities of their people, assuring the access to public goods
and services, and guaranteeing property rights, adequate access to markets and the rule
of law. Thus, the role of public policies is crucial in facilitating the progress of societies’
(Miller et al., 2017).
The exposed arguments point to the existence of a critical connection between
growth, inequality and poverty, and the role of the state through sound public poli-
cies. These links have been initially recognized by Bourguignon (2004), and subsequently
acknowledged by further research (see, e.g., Fosu, 2017 and Ravallion, 2009). According
to Bourguignon (2004), there has been a long-existing but mistaken dichotomy between
equality and growth. Following this reasoning, the set of policies that promote growth
should be separate from the role of social policies, that tackle issues like poverty and in-
equality. However, these concepts are closely linked, as Bourguignon (2004, p. 20) noted,
“... developing countries sub-utilize their productive and growth potential to a greater de-
gree in comparison to countries with fewer poor people or a more equitable distribution“.
In that sense, policies should promote equity for achieving high and sustained growth2.
1The ”ni-nis” denomination comes from the Spanish “ni estudian ni trabajan”.
2More recently, the focus has changed from inequality to inequity (Bourguignon and Walton, 2007),
with this last term conceived as the lack of opportunities (Roemer, 2009), while the former is related to
the distribution of income or consumption expenditures.
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This dissertation then aims to throw light into the linkages between sustainable growth,
poverty and inequality reduction and the influence of public policies on these outcomes.
1.2 Objectives of the study
Following Bourguignon (2004) and Montiel (2012), the links between inequality, growth,
poverty reduction, and the potential influence of public policies on these outputs can be
acknowledged using the conceptual framework depicted on Figure 1.1.
On the top of the figure, we have the goal of poverty reduction, both influenced by
the distribution of income and economic growth. These concepts are at the same time
related to each other: equity promotes economic growth through the opportunity to the
individuals to exploit their capabilities, which in turn boosts development. Growth is
defined by the so-called “deep determinants”: human geography and physical geography.
The human geography is referred to characteristics as race, ethnic diversity, religion.
These are considered to be fixed, as well as the physical geography factors: climate,
latitude, distance from the markets, among others. By being predetermined, it is assumed
that public policies can hardly influence them.
Meanwhile, in the left-hand branch (distribution and distributional changes), the
policies can and do have a crucial role in influencing the intermediate and proximate
factors. One set of policies are aimed at increasing the institutional quality of a country,
by improving contract enforcement, reducing corruption, and enhancing property rights,
among others. The set of policies relevant to this dissertation is aimed to improve human
capital, through advances in education, public services, and health, and by reducing group
inequalities.
The overall objective of the dissertation will be to assess the role of the state in the
developmental strategy in Bolivia, concerning specific policy measures. The policies that
are subject to the analysis were aimed at:
• providing a safety net that could trigger investment in education and reduce child
labor;
• increasing the transfers from the central government to the local governments, for
improving infrastructure and health; and
• evaluating the influence of the system of transfers and taxes on horizontal (i.e.,
group) inequality.
The chapters of the dissertation will be based on this conceptual framework and
will deal with policies related to education (chapter 2), health (chapter 3) and the fiscal
system of taxes and transfers’ influence on group inequality (chapter 4). Finally, chapter
5 will deal with the overall conclusions of the research and potential policy implications.
The focus on health and education outcomes is in line with the “equality of oppor-
tunities approach”, in the sense that education and health contribute to the formation
of human capital, and this is lastly the primary determinant for wealth (rather than in-
come or consumption) redistribution (Bourguignon, 2004). At the same time, the fiscal
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Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework
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system of cash and in-kind transfers can contribute to raising the standard of living of
the recipients, adding to their human capital accumulation. In this sense, the disser-
tation concerns long-term factors that contribute to sustainable growth and permanent
reduction of poverty.
1.3 Structure of the dissertation
Chapter 2: The effects of an unexpected change in expected
income on education and child labor: evidence from a Bolivian
cash transfer
In this chapter, I study the unintended consequences that an exogenous change in the
policy design (timing and size) of a cash transfer might have had on household’s decisions
over education and labor, for children and young people in school age (6 to 18 years old).
Taken as a whole, the transfers do not differ in their magnitude, but from a behavioral
point of view the change in the payment method could have an impact given inherent
behavior-specific constraints like propensity to overspend and lack of commitment to save
regularly.
I exploit the sudden and exogenous policy change using a difference-in-differences
strategy. The objective is to assess the impact of this policy change on both school
attendance and child labor comparing the outcomes of those affected by the policy change
with those who were not. This study uses the combination of two rounds of a national-
level household survey conducted in the country by the National Institute of Statistics,
before and after the policy change (years 2007 and 2008). In addition to the use of
difference-in-differences strategy, I use a combination of methodologies (matching+DiD)
to account for potential differences between the treatment and control groups.
The expected contribution of this chapter is to shed light on the effect of a change
in the design of a cash transfer. While there are plenty of evidence regarding the positive
impact of cash transfers over a variety of outcomes (e.g., income, poverty, nutrition, etc.),
few studies address the change in specific characteristics (as timing and size) that might
affect the effectiveness of such transfers.
Research Questions
• What are the effects of the change in the design (timing and size) of a cash transfer
given to the elderly in Bolivia?
• Has the change in timing and the size of the cash transfer increased attendance and
decreased child labor in those households affected by the policy change?
• What are the implications for policy design, provided the restrictions of economic
agents regarding lack of control of expenditures, propensity to overspend, or inabil-
ity to save regularly?
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Chapter 3: Increased fiscal decentralization, basic services, and
nutrition: evidence from Bolivia
A fundamental question motivates the second chapter: does (fiscal) decentralization in-
crease the delivery of public services or improve nutrition? This chapter explores this
question, by exploiting an unusual increase in fiscal resources transferred by the central
government to the municipal governments. The increase in the transfers should have im-
proved the access of households to water and sanitation, and at the same time enhanced
general living conditions leading to reduced child (under five-years-old) undernutrition.
Besides exploring fiscal decentralization, I examine potential interactions with adminis-
trative and political decentralization, using elections data at the municipal level.
The dataset utilized to explore this issue comes from various sources: the fiscal trans-
fers come from administrative records; the demographic characteristics and the access to
safe water and sanitation come from two rounds of census data (2001 and 2012). For
nutrition indicators, I combine the census data with demographic and health surveys
(DHS) for years close to the census information to estimate nutrition indicators at the
municipal level (nutrition maps methodology). The identification strategy relies on the
use of a fixed-effects panel data estimator, in which the municipal and year fixed-effects
allows to control for potential unobserved characteristics that could be correlated with
the explanatory variables of the model.
This chapter aims to fill a gap in the literature, regarding the impact of fiscal decen-
tralization on child-nutrition indicators. Also, the chapter explores the potential relation-
ship between public sector management, service delivery, and the political institutions.
Research Questions
• Has increased fiscal decentralization increased the access of the population to basic
services (safe water and sanitation), or improved child nutrition (specifically, by
reducing stunting and underweight rates in under-five years old children)?
• Does the fiscal decentralization interact with administrative decentralization mea-
sures, and with political factors involved in the decision-making at the municipal
level?
• Does the fiscal decentralization benefited the poor?
Chapter 4: Addressing horizontal inequality in Bolivia: what is
the role of fiscal policy?
Finally, the third chapter studies the role of fiscal policy in the (reduction of) horizontal
inequality. Horizontal inequality refers to the difference in income (or another welfare
indicator) as a result of the membership to a specified group (determined, e.g., by race,
gender, location, etc.). This difference could be relevant in a context in which specific
groups have been historically excluded, as the case of indigenous people in Bolivia.
With this objective in mind, I use a tax-benefit incidence analysis model to assess
the role of net public transfers (in-kind and cash transfers minus taxes) on horizontal
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inequality in Bolivia for the year 2015. The group categories are defined by ethnic status,
gender, and location, in addition to intersectionalities among those categories (e.g., being
woman and indigenous, as compared with a base group). The document explores novel
ways of defining the indigenous status, by using ethnolinguistic criteria. Besides, I study
the combination of specific characteristics (e.g., location, self-identification) that could
contribute to the native condition, through the estimation of an “indigenousness index”.
The methodology relies on a microsimulations model calibrated for Bolivia using the 2015
household survey carried out by the National Institute of Statistics.
The value added by this chapter relies on evaluating the impact of the fiscal policy on
reducing between-groups inequality. So far, much focus has been put on the exploration
of the absolute (or vertical) inequality, without taking into consideration the horizontal
dimension of inequality. Research in this area is important because it could allow the
overcome of exclusion concerning the so-called “equality of opportunities”.
Research Questions
• Has the fiscal system of taxes and transfers reduced the horizontal inequality in
Bolivia? In particular, what was the effect of the fiscal system over the inequality
of indigenous vs. non-indigenous, female vs. male, and people living in rural areas
vs. people living in urban areas, in the income distribution?
• How is this inequality increased if we combine more than two characteristics be-
longing to the groups? (i.e., being woman and indigenous).
• Is possible to integrate various dimensions to create a synthetic measure of indige-
nousness? What is the relationship of this synthetic measure with income?
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CHAPTER
TWO
THE EFFECTS OF AN UNEXPECTED CHANGE IN
EXPECTED INCOME ON EDUCATION AND CHILD
LABOR: EVIDENCE FROM A BOLIVIAN CASH TRANSFER
2.1 Introduction
Conditional and unconditional cash transfers are increasingly used in emerging countries
as a strategy to fight against poverty. Barrientos (2012) reports that between 0.75 and
1 billion people globally receive recurrent social transfers. In the Latin American region,
the leading experience of Progresa - Oportunidades in Mexico and Bolsa Escola - Bolsa
Familia in Brazil triggered a number of programs that rely in conditional and uncondi-
tional cash transfers. In Bolivia, one of the most important cash transfer programs is the
Renta Dignidad transfer, which is an unconditional pension scheme providing a monthly
sum of money to the Bolivian elderly (60 years old or more).
Renta Dignidad (RD) has its origins in the BONOSOL, an oldest unconditional
cash transfer. From their beginning in 1997, BONOSOL Program transferred Bs.1800
(approximately USD 260, considering a rate of change of Bs.7=USD 1 in 1997) in cash
to citizens over 65 years old. In December 2007, a law changed the scheme from 2008
onwards, changing some characteristics of the Program like the eligibility criteria (which
was reduced from 65 years to 60 years old), the name of the Program (from BONOSOL
to Renta Dignidad) and, most importantly, the timing of the transfer: instead of giving
it as a lump-sum once-a-year transfer of USD 240, the Program changed the transfer to
be instead a monthly installment of near USD 20.3.
This chapter tries to shed light on the potential consequences of this change in
education and child labor outcomes. The research aims to contribute to the literature
about the impact of the change in relevant characteristics of cash transfers’ programs.
In other words, we want to know better the potential consequences of a change in the
design of cash transfers’ programs over specific indicators (in this case, education and
child labor).
3This amount varied slightly if the recipient was already receiving other pension. Details are provided
in subsection 2.2.2.
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While Renta Dignidad’s amount was approximately the same as BONOSOL consid-
ering the yearly sum, this change might have had important consequences for the recipi-
ents and their families. BONOSOL’s amount was sizable compared to average monthly
income (Martinez, 2005 reports that BONOSOL’s amount represented around 27% of
national per capita income, 50% of income of the poor and 85% of annual income of the
extreme poor), so it could have served as a start-up capital, easing credit constraints
and enabling risk-taking activities that would lead to future increased returns. Because
of saving constraints, it is possible that the smaller, but more frequent payments would
be diluted through increased consumption without a lasting profitable use, although this
claim is an empirical one.
One of the potential uses of a cash transfer could be to invest in the education of
children in school age. Education is one of the most profitable investments (Psacharopou-
los and Patrinos, 2004), considered as one of the most important means for improving
life standards and getting out of poverty in the long term (Mihai et al., 2015). There is
plenty of evidence regarding the positive impact of education on earnings (see Card, 2007
for a survey of the literature; a clever study exploiting an exogenous change with robust
evidence is provided in Duflo, 2004), health (Kemptner et al., 2011), and wealth (Boshara
et al., 2015). In turn, there is consensus about the (mostly) positive impact of conditional
and unconditional cash transfers over education (among others, see Araujo et al., 2017
for evidence of the impact of a cash transfer program in Ecuador; de Groot et al., 2015
analyze the impact of a cash transfer in Ghana). However, there are few studies regarding
the impact of the change in cash transfers’ programs design over education (to the best
of our knowledge, Barrera Osorio et al., 2011 is the only one that addresses this topic
using a randomized control trial [RCT] in Colombia). In that sense, this research aims to
contribute to the body of evidence with respect to the changing design of cash transfers,
exploiting an exogenous policy modification in Bolivia.
The chapter encompasses the following sections: in the second part we will discuss
the BONOSOL origins, their turning into RD and the potential consequences of this
policy change, the third section will frame the empirical strategy and describe the data.
In the fifth section we will present the results of the impact evaluation and present various
robustness checks. Finally, Part 6 will conclude by suggesting possible strands for further
investigation.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Origins of BONOSOL
Cash transfers are relatively a new phenomenon in the Bolivian social policy. Preceding
those, public works programs for generating jobs and income in financial stress times were
probably among the first safety net programs. One of the first public works programs
(not only in Bolivia but in Latin America) was the Bolivian FSE program (Fondo Social
de Emergencia - Emergency Social Fund), which ran from 1987 to 1991. FSE invested
roughly USD 198 million and helped to create 21.000 new direct jobs (Siri, 2003) and
later, FIS and PLANE programs replaced FSE relying as well in a public works scheme
to offer temporary jobs and income to vulnerable households.
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A particular type of cash transfer, the “BONOSOL”4 was implemented in 1997. It
was a non-contributory pension scheme, consisting in a sum of money transferred to all
elderly when they turned 65 years old and later-on, provided they had 21 years old or
more up to December the 31th, 19955. The funding for BONOSOL pension scheme came
from the revenues of the privatization of some of the biggest public enterprises owned
by the Bolivian state until 1995. BONOSOL transfer started in 1997 with a budget
of approximately USD 87 million for that year, involving roughly 364,000 beneficiaries
(Antonio, 2007). It was planned that this pension scheme would have a limited duration
over time, and that the last beneficiary would receive their BONOSOL in year 2056
(Gamboa-Rivera, 2006). According to estimations, in the first 38 years the dividends
from the Bolivian slice6 would fund the pension scheme, while in the following years it
should be financed by selling the remaining stock.
As mentioned, coverage of the transfer was universal for all elderly who had 65
years old or more, but restricted to the cohort aged 21 and over in 1995 (according to the
Bolivian Capitalization Law 1544). The cash benefit involved a yearly transfer of Bs.1800
(roughly USD342 using the USD/Boliviano average official exchange rate in 1997), which
was a very significant amount taking into account the poverty levels of the country and the
enormous differences about quality of life between rural and urban areas. One particular
characteristic was that the beneficiary received the transfer in their birthday each year
after he/she turned 65 years old (starting on their 65th birthday).
BONOSOL program was subject to critics from its beginning due to the following
factors (Gamboa-Rivera, 2006): i) the transfer was granted in an electoral year (1997),
which lead to prebendalism suspicion; ii) there were doubts regarding its financial sus-
tainability over time; iii) life expectancy was less than 65 years old in Bolivia at that
time, so the actual impact of the transfer would not be relevant. Despite these criticisms,
the administration initiated the distribution of the transfer in 1997. The new admin-
istration that took over the government in 1998 discontinued the cash transfer for two
years, but started their distribution again in 2000, with a much smaller amount (USD
60 instead of USD 240). Timing of the benefit’s distribution remained annual, but the
administration changed the name to “Bolivida” (for more details see Barja and Urquiola,
2003). Earlier BONOSOL (with the initial sum of money) was re-established in 2002,
restoring the lump-sum to USD 240 and changing the name back to “BONOSOL”. Due
to the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 90s, the government was pressured to carry
out a tax reform in the country, but failed in their attempt7. After strong social unrest,
President Sanchez de Lozada (who established the BONOSOL for the first time) resigned
in 2003. Despite this adverse scenario, payment of the BONOSOL was maintained until
2007, although criticisms on the funding of the universal pension scheme remained (for
example see Garron, 2007).
4Abbreviation in Spanish which means “Solidarity Bond”.
5This is specified in the Law 1732, which created the transfer.
6The privatization scheme was a partial privatization, in which 50% of the public enterprises were
sold to international investors and the remaining 50% were transferred to all Bolivian nationals that were
21 years old or older up to December the 31th, 1995.
7Basically, they tried to set up a proper income tax, but dealt with a drastic reduction of popular
support (Perreault, 2006)
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2.2.2 Policy change: from BONOSOL to Renta Dignidad (RD)
At the end of 2007, several changes were made to the BONOSOL program. The Congress
approved those changes to the law on November 28, 2007, although the new scheme would
start from January, 1, 2008. Among various modifications to the original BONOSOL,
the new pension transfer included the following features: i) the name changed to Renta
Dignidad; ii) the beneficiaries will be 60 years old or older Bolivian citizens (instead of
65 years old); and iii) the cash transfer would be paid monthly, instead of yearly as the
BONOSOL. The amount of the RD transfer was Bs200 monthly (USD 27) for people not
receiving any other pension, and Bs150 (USD 20 or 75% of the whole transfer) for people
with another pension scheme.
We argue that the change in the timing of the transfer could have consequences in
the decision making process of the recipient households (a household where at least an
eligible member lives) and, in specific, we want to investigate if this change could have
influenced the schooling decisions for children in school age (6 to 18 years old) living in
the household.
The change in the cash transfer policy could have affected schooling decisions through
various channels. One of these channels could be financial: at the beginning of the school
year (which in Bolivia runs from February to November), the families need to spend a
large sum of money in their children enrollment, for example by purchasing uniforms,
textbooks and other types of school materials. Given the unexpected and sudden policy
change in December of 2007 (and active since January 2008), the households in which a
recipient lives received a much smaller quantity of money (provided their expectations
about receiving a sizable lump sum). The reasoning implies that the households cannot
afford anymore the fixed expenditure in education demanded by their children at the
beginning of the year, and this maybe lead to a reduction in the education expenditure.
The policy change then involves a reduction in enrollment or attendance, or even an
increase in child labor, if the shock is strong enough that push families to look for other
sources of income.
It could be argued that, because the transfer is given to the elderly, it should not have
any other effect than on the own recipient’s decisions (e.g., increasing its consumption).
Indeed, maybe this could be the case for elderly living alone8. However, Latin America is
one of the regions of the world with the most presence of extended families (Scott et al.,
2015), meaning that it is likely that the elderly live with their children and grandchildren.
This implies that a transfer given to an elderly (and all the changes to it) have more
chances of affecting the decisions of the extended family. For example, Bertrand et al.
(2003) explores the implications of cash transfers given to old adults in South Africa,
provided that in South Africa many families still encompasses elder members living with
the nuclear family. The authors find that when elderly are eligible for receiving the
pension, there is a reduction of working hours of other members of the extended family.
As another example, Duflo (2003) explore the potential effect of a social pension on
nutrition indicators of children living with elderly (multigenerational households). She
finds that the cash transfer had a positive impact on nourishment indicators (reducing
8Although even in this setting we could not rule-out potential transfers to their children or grandchil-
dren.
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stunting and wasting), especially on girls, when the recipient was a female pensioner. This
evidence suggests that the effect of a cash transfer given to elderly could have impacts
on the extended family, dependent on the context.
The consequences of the change in the timing of the transfer are not necessarily neg-
ative. A monthly transfer, even if smaller than the earlier one, imply that the household
have a continuous flow of resources that could serve to afford recurrent expenditures, for
example, to pay school fees, transport to the school, or other recurrent costs. In this
sense, the policy change could instead imply an increase in school enrollment and atten-
dance, and/or a decrease in child labor. By testing both possibilities, the effect of this
policy change is indeed an empirical question.
2.2.3 Potential consequences of the change in the timing: em-
pirical evidence
A part of the recent literature regarding policy interventions and their effect in develop-
ment are focused in the role of “nudges”. This concept involves a slight change in policy, in
order to change or improve certain behavior. An example would be changing the default
option in an application for retirement scheme triggered retirement savings (Beshears
et al., 2009). Since the seminal work of Richard Thaler (see Thaler, 1985; Kahneman
et al., 1991; Barberis and Thaler, 2003, among others), it has been recognized that most of
the assumptions in which microeconomic theory relies are unrealistic, despite simplifying
the analysis (Gowdy and Erickson, 2005; Datta and Mullainathan, 2014). One of these
assumptions is the behavior of economic agents about the future. In a standard model
of decision, we assume that a rational economic agent discounts the future by using a
known rate (discount rate), and that this rate is constant over the time. However, studies
have challenged this view about the future and how we evaluate the decisions to take,
by formulating other discounting mechanism called “hyperbolic discounting”, in which
economic agents are more impatient in the near future, while in the far future they are
more patient: the so-called present bias.
World Bank (2015) mentions that the present bias can affect the financial decisions
made by households and make them sub-optimal. People tend to postpone difficult
and complex financial decisions, for example regarding which insurance scheme to pick,
but are more impatient on immediately-satisfying experiences, such as consumption. A
potential consequence of this behavior is to over-consume in the present and to avoid
taking important long-term decisions, like to which insurance scheme to affiliate. Policy
can avoid this present bias through nudges and reminders, modification of default options,
facilitating the so-called commitment devices, simplifying financial education, and using
emotional persuasion.
Given the difficulty of economic agents regarding compromise (reflected in the present-
bias problem), a potential policy solution would be to match the timing of income with
the specific needs of the recipients. For example, Duflo et al. (2011) finds that farmers in
Kenya increase fertilizer use if they can pre-purchase it at the harvest time, when they
most probably have the available funds. In this way, by changing the possibility of pur-
chasing the fertilizer in advance and by varying the timing of transfers to coincide with
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the purchase, policy makers help to reconcile the needs of the farmer with their funds’
availability.
Haushofer and Shapiro (2013) uses a transitory cash transfer scheme and make an
experiment by varying the timing of the transfer (monthly and small transfer vs. a much
higher lump-sum at over a longer period). The authors find that the lump-sum transfers
favor asset accumulation but the monthly transfer favor food security (through more
consumption). Additionally, the authors find that the lump-sum transfer is associated
with lower levels of cortisol, meaning that the people that is receiving the lump-sum
transfer is less stressed than the people receiving the monthly transfer. This would be
because of the inability of the monthly recipients to save in order to make an important
investment (which would require an initially-big amount of money). The authors do not
find a difference with respect to the gender of the recipient (being this lump sum or
monthly).
There is evidence that large lump sums might facilitate asset building or serve for
investment. Muriithi and Matz (2015) study the effect of selling horticultural products
in Kenya over smallholders’ welfare measures (income and assets). The smallholders
could sell their products to domestic or foreign markets (or both). One characteristic of
the domestic market was that the smallholders were paid in bulk (as a single payment),
while if the transaction involved the foreign market the payments were instead spread in
installments. The authors find that the commercialization through the exports market
was positively correlated to increased income but not to asset-building. This finding
was explained by the fact that the proceeds for the foreign commercialization, as paid
in installments, could be easily “eaten up”, preventing their potential use for purchase
durable goods (investment), provided the absence of savings mechanisms.
Similarly, Barrera Osorio et al. (2011) find evidence that the modification in the
timing of a conditional cash transfer in Colombia improves educational outcomes (in-
creases enrollment and attendance, and decreases child labor). The modification consists
in holding back a part of a regular (bi-monthly) transfer and to give the retained funds
as a lump sum at the beginning of the next school year. The rationale would be that at
the beginning of the year there is a greater need for sizable expenditures like textbooks,
uniforms and so on, and the yearly sizable transfer would serve better to this objective.
In effect, the authors report that one of the most important reasons for dropping out
school is the financial constraints that some households face, especially at the beginning
of the school year. In this sense, retaining funds this year and make them available in the
next school year would alleviate potential savings or credit constraints. So, coinciding
the time of the necessity with the time (and the magnitude) of the transfer could increase
welfare for the recipients.
While the evidence presented so far favors the retention (collection) of transfers,
to make them coincide with specific needs of the recipients, another empirical strand
argues that partitioning payments could be welfare-improving. For example, if households
are impatient and they tend to over-consume resources when the payments are made,
increasing the frequency of the payments would allow households to smooth consumption,
and thus to increase welfare.
For example, Stephens and Unayama (2011) uses an exogenous yet expected change
in a pension payment in Japan. The pension timing was once every three months and
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then it changed to once every two months. The authors find that, after the change in the
timing, households can smooth consumption better. The reason is that given an impatient
behavior, household’s consumption increase upon reception of the income/transfer and
then significantly declines over the exhaustion cycle of the payment. In this sense, this
evidence suggest that more frequent payments may reduce fluctuations in consumption.
Shapiro (2005) finds that people receiving food stamps in the US decrease their
caloric intake by 10 to 15 percent over the month, reflecting short-term impatience and,
as the end of the month approaches, the recipient households are in hardship reducing
the quality or even the quantity in terms of the caloric intake. In this sense, they argue,
a policy recommendation to ameliorate this behavior is to break the payments twice a
month instead of once a month. In doing so, the resulting consumption smoothing allows
to better plan their caloric intake during the month, and in this way to increase their
welfare.
Using hospitalization records in California from years 1994 to 2000, Dobkin and
Puller (2007) notes a sudden increase in the use of certain illegal drugs after payment
of welfare benefits on the first day of the month. This behaviour implied a costly peak
regarding restricted health resources (hospital, qualified human resources, etc.) each
month. The authors then used an exogenous change in the timing of welfare distribution,
and find that a more staggered distribution of welfare benefits helped to smooth the cycle
of drug abuse and further hospitalization. Here, a policy recommendation would be to
consider alternative timing of welfare benefits to avoid a potential “full wallet” effect that
could have an adverse effect on drug abusers.
From this literature review, we could conclude that the effect of a change in the
frequency of payments depends on the context and purpose of the money. For one side, the
first group of evidence shows that accumulation of payments serve better if specific needs
match a bigger transfer, i.e. one that requires a “pooling” of resources, thus improving
the welfare of the recipients. Meanwhile, the second group of evidence suggest that a
more phased distribution of resources help to smooth consumption and in this way to
increase well-being of the recipients.
Considering the above, we plan to explore further the Bolivian experience on the
change of timing of BONOSOL/RD transfer to evaluate its consequences for the recipi-
ents and their families. A change in the timing of a payment or transfer might lead to
adjustments in the individual as well in the household’s decisions. Individual and col-
lective decisions are related to how much to spend, save and/or invest, and spending in
child’s education is one of the most important decisions that a family can take.
We picked attendance to the school and child labor as outcome variables because
those reflect households’ key decisions regarding the education of their children. While
these activities are not mutually exclusive, a child who have to study and work at the
same time will face greater challenges in comparison with a child whose only activity is to
attend to the school, as plenty of research have shown in countries as Paraguay (Patrinos
and Psacharopoulos, 1995), Tanzania (Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos, 1999) and Ghana
(Heady, 2003). The effects of child labor ranges from decreased reading competence,
increased chance of repetition and reduced educational attainment (Beegle et al., 2009),
which could reproduce in last stance the poverty vicious cycle for the individuals and
their families.
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2.3 Empirical strategy
To find the impact of the change in timing of the BONOSOL/RD cash transfer scheme
we would need to compare the outcomes with and without the policy change for the same
households (counterfactual). Of course, this is not possible as we only see the “control”
households (without the policy change) in 2007 and the “treatment” households (with
the policy change) in 2008. A na¨ıve approach addressing this problem is to consider the
outcome in 2007 and compare it with the outcome in 2008. In doing so, we would be
ignoring other factors (confounders) that could cause a change in the outcome after the
policy change (Gertler et al., 2016; Blackman, 2013). To avoid this, we use instead a
difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to estimate the causal effect of the policy change.
DiD is often used to analyze the effects of policy changes or natural experiments (Blundell
and Dias, 2009), and/or when the change comes unexpectedly (Khandker et al., 2009).
DiD have the advantage of netting out the effect of any time-invariant effect that could
also affect to the outcome before and after the policy change.
To apply the DiD strategy we need to define clearly the treatment and control groups,
before and after the policy change (which happened as of January 2008). The treatment
group is composed of those pupils living in a household in which an elderly who has
been subject to the policy change also lives. An elderly was subject to the policy change
if he/she turned 65 years old or more until December 31, 2007, so he/she received the
BONOSOL in 2007 at least once. In turn, the control group are those pupils living in
households in which there was no elderly entitled to receive the benefit as of 2007.9
Thus, a 65-years old person that received BONOSOL transfer in 2007 for the first
time would not receive BONOSOL anymore from 2008 onwards. Instead, he/she received
the much-smaller monthly transfer (RD). This example applies to all elderly that had at
least 65 years old in 2007 and who received the BONOSOL in that year.
It is important to state that the policy change implied two main modifications: the
first one, by changing the yearly transfer to a monthly one (and on which this research is
focused). The second change is the modification in the criteria to be entitled to receive
the transfer (60 years old instead of 65) from 2008 onwards. For our empirical strategy,
we take into account only those households that have a recipient who had at least 65 years
old in 2007 and received the BONOSOL in that year.10 In this way, we are taking into
account the potential effect that the policy change regarding the timing of the transfer
could have had in household’s education decisions11.
In equation terms, the DiD coefficients can be estimated using OLS with the following
expression:
yih = β0 + β1y2008ih + β2Treatmentih + β3y2008ih · Treatmentih + ih (2.1)
9If the elderly were entitled to receive the benefit (i.e., had at least 65 years old by 2007) but not
received it, we classify them as pertaining to the control group.
10Thus, we rule out the “new recipients” (i.e. those between 60 and 64 years old in 2008 and received
the RD benefit in 2008 for the first time).
11There are a few cases in which a couple of beneficiaries live in the same household, with one recipient
affected by the policy change and the other receiving the RD for the first time. In those cases, we assume
that the dominating effect is that of the policy change, that is, the loss of the expected large transfer.
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Where i and h subscripts refer to individual i living in household h. y2008 is a
variable that takes the value of one for observations in year 2008 and zero otherwise
(policy-change dummy). Treatmentih takes the value of one if the pupil lives in a house-
hold where at least a beneficiary was subject to the policy change, and zero otherwise.
The coefficient of interest in this DiD setup is β1 + β3, i.e. the Average Treatment
Effect on the Treated (ATET). This is because β3 alone reflect the average treatment
effect (ATE) of the policy change among treatment and control individuals. Instead, we
are interested in the effect of the treatment (policy change) only on the treated individuals
(ATET), i.e. on the individuals subject of the policy change (Imbens and Wooldridge,
2007; Newey, 2007).
The difference-in-differences method relies in two key assumptions: the ‘parallel
trends’ assumption and the Stable Unit Treatment Value (SUTVA) characteristic (Black-
man, 2013). The so-called parallel trends imply that the outcome of interest (in our case,
the attendance to school and child labor) would have had the same trend, had the policy
change did not happened. As this implies a counterfactual, there is no way to prove it.
However, some authors (Blundell and Dias, 2009; Gertler et al., 2016; Khandker et al.,
2009) consider that a plausible check for this assumption would be to plot the outcomes’
paths (represented by their averages) before the policy change using previous round(s)
of the data. In our case, we rely on a previous round of the household survey (2006) to
plot such tracks, as shown in Figure 2.1:
As Figure 2.1 shows, the paths of both outcomes are similar before the policy change
(this is very clear in the case of child labor). In the case of the attendance rate, while the
trends are roughly the same, it decreases noticeably for the treatment group in comparison
with the control group in 2007 (just before the policy change). After the policy change,
the average attendance rate in the treatment group increases significantly. In the case of
child labor (lower panel), after the policy change the treatment group exhibits almost a
flat trajectory, while the average of the control group increases more in comparison. While
this evidence is not conclusive, it depicts that both outcome variables have roughly the
same trajectory before the policy change, so we would plausibly expect that the behavior
of both outcomes would have been the same in absence of the policy change.
In turn, the SUTVA assumption implies the absence of treatment spillovers. That
is, despite not being subject to the treatment (policy change in our case), the control
group would be influenced anyways and will change their behavior (so the evaluation of
impact will be somehow “contaminated” Blackman, 2013). In the context of the present
research, SUTVA implies that the policy change have not changed the behavior of those
that were not subject of the policy change. We think that it would be difficult that the
policy change, that was exogenous and totally unexpected, could trigger a change in the
attendance rate or child labor of those who were not affected by the policy change. In
that sense, assuming SUTVA in this case seems to be reasonable.
2.3.1 Data
We use a Bolivian household survey, the Encuesta de Hogares (EH) carried out by the
National Institute of Statistics for years 2007 and 2008 (EH 2007 and EH 2008). In
addition, we use earlier and later rounds (2006 and 2009 respectively), for robustness
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Figure 2.1: Parallel trends check
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Lower panel shows the trajectory of the average child work rate.
The vertical line represents the policy change.
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checks purposes. The EH is a household survey similar to World Bank’s Living Standards
Measurement Study (LSMS) survey. It incorporates a full set of socio-economic and
demographic information about households in Bolivia12. While EH 2007 and EH 2008
information is collected by the same institution and using the same sampling procedure,
both are based in independent sampling procedures. In this sense, the dataset is a
repeated cross-sections for years 2007 and 2008 (and eventually years 2006 and 2009 as
well). The sample size of the survey is 31,834 individuals in roughly 7,958 households
assuming an average household size of 4 persons per household.
We are interested in educational outcomes that could have been affected by the policy
change in BONOSOL/RD cash scheme. In this sense, our sample consists in children and
youth whose age is between 6 and 18 years old13. We model the outcome variables as
dummy variables: “attendance” takes a value of one if the person is currently attending
to the school and zero otherwise; “worked” takes a value of one if the person reported
that he/she worked at least one hour during the last week, and zero otherwise.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample (children in regular school
age, from six to eighteen years old), by comparing average individual and household
characteristics for each year (2007 and 2008). The “treatment” column corresponds to
those pupils living in a household that was subject to the policy change, in contrast to
those who were not affected by this change (“control”). We apply a two-sided means test
to both groups in each year.
Results from the means test show that none of the differences in our proposed out-
come variables (attendance and child labor) is statistically significant for any of the
two years. Considering individual characteristics of affected against those who were not
affected by the policy change, Table 2.1 shows that there are statistically significant dif-
ferences on native status and gender. In 2008, there are more native-origin children living
in those households that were affected by the policy change than in the households that
were unaffected. Meanwhile, there are more girls living in affected households, but again
the difference is only significant for year 2008. Finally, children in affected households are
enrolled in private schools more than non-recipients, although this difference is significant
only for year 2007.
Regarding household characteristics, Table 2.1 shows that there are less school-aged
members in recipient households than in non-recipient households. Recipient’s house-
holds have heads that are consistently older than non-recipient’s, perhaps because the
recipients are the heads themselves, and so they pull up the average age. This fact could
be consistent with female household head averages, which shows that there are more
female household heads in recipient households, being this related to the characteristic
feature of greater longevity of women in comparison with men. About other household
characteristics, Table 2.1 shows that there are more recipients living in rural areas and
more recipient households with native heads.
As shown in Table 2.1, the treatment group is remarkably larger than the control
group. Some authors have suggested the use of matching techniques in combination with
the DiD methodology [MDID] (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Gebel and Voßemer, 2014),
12Additional information about metadata of household surveys can be found at http://www.ine.gob.
bo/anda/index.php/home
13This is the official age span for compulsory primary and secondary education.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
2007 2008
Variables Treatment Control Diff. Treatment Control Diff.
Attendance 0.9715 0.9832 0.01 0.9931 0.9888 −0.01
Child labor 0.2539 0.2562 −0.00 0.2749 0.3058 0.04
Native proxy 0.1606 0.1772 0.00* 0.3058 0.2620 −0.05*
Female 0.4767 0.4854 0.03* 0.5395 0.4951 −0.05*
Private school 0.1192 0.0763 −0.04* 0.1203 0.0942 −0.03*
Age 12.3446 12.0236 −0.50 12.0825 11.9719 −0.15
First born proxy 0.5363 0.4604 −0.08*** 0.5601 0.4612 −0.09***
HH members in school age 2.6451 2.8982 0.25*** 2.3643 2.7796 0.41***
Rural household 0.3627 0.3153 −0.07 0.4777 0.4499 −0.04
Head is employed 0.7306 0.9174 0.17*** 0.7526 0.9462 0.19***
Native household head proxy 0.3731 0.4159 0.01** 0.5326 0.4753 −0.07**
Age of the household head 59.0544 42.5340 −16.15*** 59.2784 42.0641 −17.94***
Household head is female 0.3368 0.2299 −0.11*** 0.3333 0.2121 −0.11***
Household head has college studies 0.1373 0.1475 0.01 0.0962 0.1129 0.02
Log of durable goods value 8.0460 7.8139 −0.19 7.9880 7.9144 −0.11
Log of monthly food expenditure 7.1329 7.0513 −0.07 7.2061 7.1709 −0.04
N 4797 446 4065 336
Source: Own elaboration based on EH2007 and EH2008.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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in order to ensure better comparability between treated and control groups, both before
and after the policy change. As suggested in Blundell and Dias (2009), we will rely in
an MDID strategy by estimating the propensity of being treated, using information on
observable characteristics (at individual and household level) of the treated group after
treatment to build the control groups. Afterwards, the DiD will be applied relying on
the matched set of observations.
Specifically, to estimate the MDID, we follow the next steps14:
1. We use the treated group after treatment as the baseline for matching the remaining
groups (treated/before, non-treated/before and non-treated/after).
2. With the estimated baseline, we reproduce the distribution of the variables used to
apply the matching for the other three groups15
3. Once we have the baseline group and the matched sets of controls (each with their
respective weights), we estimate the model as expressed in Equation 2.1 using only
the baseline and the matched observations.
Following Guo and Fraser (2014), we use a set of variables that would probably influ-
ence the attendance and child labor outcomes. We classify the variables into individual
characteristics and household characteristics. As individual characteristics, we use age,
squared age, gender, native status of the children16, a first-born dummy, and private
school dummy. Household characteristics includes: number of household members in
school age (6 y.o. to 18 y.o.), age of the household head, squared household head age,
monthly food expenditures (log), self-assessed value of durable goods (log); gender and
native status of the household head, if the household head is currently working, if he/she
has some or completed university education and if the household is located in the rural
area.
The balancing procedure proves to be effective, given the distribution of the propen-
sity scores, as shown in Figure 2.2.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Attendance
We report the results from the estimation of the model in Equation 2.1 using OLS for
the attendance variable as defined above. We divide the estimation results in three parts:
the first and second columns show the results corresponding to the primary cohort (6
y.o. to 11 y.o.) and secondary cohort (12 y.o. to 18 y.o.), respectively. The third column
14The regression results from the matching procedure are shown in the appendix.
15If a treated-after is not matched in some of the other three control groups, it needs to be dropped.
16There is a specific question in the questionnaire regarding self-membership into an indigenous group,
but it is only asked to persons that are 12 years or older. So, we evaluate the native status by checking
if the person has learned to talk in a native tongue, i.e. the variable takes the value of zero if the person
has learned to talk in Spanish.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of propensity scores
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reports the results corresponding to the full sample (i.e., pupils between 6 and 18 years
old).
Table 2.2 shows the results corresponding to attendance as an outcome variable of
the DiD model. Policy change from BONOSOL to RD could imply a negative change in
attendance because the affected families would adjust for this loss of expected income and,
in an extreme case, stop sending their children to the school. However, other possibility
could be that the frequent payments might enable to the household to plan better their
expenditures, to have more predictability about their cash streams, and so to decide that
their children attend regularly to the school.
The marginal effect of the policy change (ATET) is statistically significant at the 1%
level, signaling a positive and statistically significant effect of the policy change on atten-
dance to the school. The estimated coefficient implies that, without the policy change, the
attendance rate would have been 0.96 instead of 0.99 (an increase of 3 percentage points).
In addition, it is important to note that the effect on the secondary cohort is positive
as well, indicating that grown-up pupils could have benefited from this policy change.
The magnitude of the change in this cohort is the double than using the whole sample:
without the policy change, the attendance rate in the secondary cohort would have been
0.925 instead of 0.9873 (the observed value), implying an increase of 6 percentage points.
This results are in line with the story regarding the positive effects of the policy
change, presumably because it implied greater stability and predictability of payments.
While the sizable lump-sum would have been useful in affording items as uniforms, text-
books, and school fees, it could be the case that the lump-sum needs to be available
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Table 2.2: Estimation results from DiD + matching. Dependent variable=attend
(1) (2)
Secondary Whole
Treatment −0.049* −0.029**
(0.026) (0.012)
y2008 0.021 0.007
(0.016) (0.006)
Treatment*y2008 0.042 0.026*
(0.028) (0.014)
ATET 0.062*** 0.033***
F-test 7.531 7.373
p-value 0.006 0.007
Observations 610 1,228
R2 0.027 0.014
∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients were estimated using the matched sam-
ple. Matching procedure implied the dropping of primary-school cohort. Treatment take the value of
one if the individual was treated, zero otherwise. y2008 takes the value of one in 2008, zero otherwise.
specifically at the beginning of the year, which is when families really need the money
(Barrera Osorio et al., 2011). It is also important to note that the ATE (average treatment
effect) is positive, implying that the policy change could have had a positive effect for
both treated and non-treated groups (as indicated by the sign of the interacted coefficient
[Treatment∗y2008]).
2.4.2 Child and youth labor
We consider in this section the effect of the policy change on the decision to work (con-
sidering school-aged pupils). Our dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes
the value of one if the children/youth in school age have worked in the last week before
the interview, and zero otherwise. Even if children reported not having worked in the
last week, additional questions inquiry if they have taken part in work-related activities.
Other activities considered as work are: helping in agriculture-related activities, working
in the family business, street vending, and kitchen assistant, among others (excluding
normal household chores, which are not considered as child labor). The question about
labor activities is restricted to household members that have 7 years-old or more. In that
sense, the size of the sample is slightly reduced in comparison with the other estimations.
Table 2.3 shows the results of the estimation and the corresponding marginal effects
of the policy change (ATET) for pupils living in eligible households versus non-eligible
households.
The results in Table 2.3 show a strong effect of the policy change (ATET) in the
secondary cohort. This result is coherent given that a secondary-school child is more able
to work (both physically and mentally), so the effect of the policy change could be relevant
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Table 2.3: Estimation results from DiD + matching. Dependent variable=worked
(1) (2) (3)
Primary Secondary Whole
Treatment 0.053 −0.158*** 0.006
(0.047) (0.061) (0.039)
y2008 0.308*** −0.323*** 0.014
(0.054) (0.057) (0.039)
Treatment*y2008 −0.295*** 0.214*** −0.071
(0.076) (0.078) (0.055)
ATET 0.013 −0.109** −0.057
F-test 0.059 4.114 2.223
p-value 0.807 0.043 0.136
Observations 555 610 1,165
R2 0.067 0.058 0.003
∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients were estimated using the matched sam-
ple. Treatment take the value of one if the individual was treated, zero otherwise. y2008 takes the value
of one in 2008, zero otherwise.
only for this cohort. The statistically insignificant result regarding primary cohort is not
surprising, given that the legal age for working in Bolivia was at least 14 years old. The
estimated marginal effect imply that the proportion of working youth between 12 and
18 years old would have been 0.33 instead of the observed value of 0.27, a difference
of about 6 percentage points. In addition, results from the parameters’ estimation of
the DiD model shows us that the ATE of the policy change (given by the interaction
coefficient) is positive for the secondary school cohort, but its effect is attenuated by the
y2008 dummy variable, indicating a strong decrease of child labor from 2007 to 2008 (the
magnitude of the decrease is of 21 percentage points).
While the results using the full sample are weaker in statistical sense, the negative
sign of the ATET indicates that the policy change might have triggered a reduction in
child labor in general (for both cohorts).
2.4.3 Robustness checks
2.4.3.1 DiD and covariates
While the estimation of the MDID model is commonly utilized with datasets consisting of
repeated cross sections, we should obtain similar results by using a related approach. This
approach consists in estimating the model in Equation 2.1, including a set of covariates
that take into account the differences between treatment and control groups. In other
words, we estimate the following model by OLS:
yih = β0+β1y2008ih+β2Treatmentih+β3y2008ih ·Treatmentih+γ ·Xih+ψ·Zh+ih (2.2)
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Where i and h subscripts refer to individual i living in household h.
Independent variables include y2008 as a variable that takes the value of one for
observations in year 2008 and zero otherwise (policy-change dummy). Treatmentih takes
the value of one if the pupil lives in a household where at least a beneficiary was subject
to the policy change, and zero otherwise.
X is a vector of individual characteristics including gender, the proxy for native
status and the interaction between both. Additionally, we include a dummy for the
type of school the children attends (=1 for private school). Household characteristics
are included in the vector Z, including education of the household head, location of the
household (urban or rural), among others. In all estimations, we use clustered standard
errors at the primary sampling unit (PSU)17.
Table 2.4 shows the results corresponding to attendance as an outcome variable of
the DiD model. The marginal effect of the policy change regarding the whole sample
is statistically significant, although its magnitude is rather small: it implies that the
attendance proportion would have been 0.98 had the policy change not occurred.
Table 2.4: DiD model with covariates. Dependent variable=attend
(1) (2) (3)
Primary Secondary Whole
Treatment*y2008 0.007 0.019 0.014
(0.006) (0.018) (0.011)
Treatment −0.003 0.002 −0.001
(0.006) (0.015) (0.010)
y2008 −0.003 0.011** 0.004
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
ATET 0.004 0.030* 0.018*
F-test 0.574 2.912 2.772
p-value 0.449 0.088 0.096
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4432 4386 8818
R2 .0067751 .0241238 .0206516
∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the PSU (primary sampling unit) level.
The dependent variable is measured at the individual level. The included controls are: if the children
attends to a private school, a first-born dummy, gender, native status, and the interaction between both
(measured at the individual level), as well as household controls.
With respect to the marginal effects by age cohort, the marginal effects (ATET)
are statistical significant at the 10% level only for the secondary cohort. Another char-
acteristic of the results for separate cohorts is that the variable corresponding to the
post-policy change (y2008) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the
secondary cohort. This suggests that attendance has increased from 2007 to 2008 in the
17PSU is a geographical area consisting in 80 to 350 houses, from which the houses for the survey are
randomly selected.
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control group (i.e., those not subject to the policy change). This result coincides with
the evolution of attendance rate as shown in Table 2.1.
According to the household characteristics, children living in more educated (as ap-
proximated by university education of the household head) and more mature household
head are more prone to attend school attendance, being these the only statistically sig-
nificant covariates in the model (see Table A1 and Table A2 in the appendix). The
covariates of the model with cohort distinction confirm that children attending private
school are less prone to attend to the school, but only in the secondary cohort. In that
group the older children shows less attendance to the school, since older children near
to the school completion could be more profitable out of the school rather than finishing
their education.
In turn, Table 2.5 shows the estimation results using child labor as the dependent
variable. The results indicate negative marginal effects (ATET) for the whole sample
and for the secondary cohort (although only the result correspondent to the secondary
cohort is statistically significant at 10% level). The ATET for the secondary cohort imply
that the labor rate would have been 0.32 instead of the average observed rate of 0.23 (a
difference of roughly 8 percentage points). In addition, results from the estimation shows
that the ATE of the policy change (given by the interaction coefficient) is negative for
the secondary school cohort, meaning that the policy change triggered a decrease in child
work among eligible and non-eligible households.
Table 2.5: DiD model with covariates. Dependent variable=worked
(1) (2) (3)
Primary Secondary Whole
Treatment*y2008 0.029 −0.081 −0.032
(0.045) (0.050) (0.040)
Treatment −0.026 −0.000 −0.009
(0.037) (0.037) (0.031)
y2008 −0.021 −0.002 −0.009
(0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
ATET 0.008 −0.082* −0.041
F-test 0.031 2.786 1.098
p-value 0.860 0.096 0.295
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3790 4386 8176
R2 .345411 .3177649 .3291781
∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the PSU (primary sampling unit) level.
The dependent variable is measured at the individual level. The included controls are: if the children
attends to a private school, a first-born dummy, gender, native status, and the interaction between both
(measured at the individual level), as well as household controls.
With respect to the other explanatory variables included in the model, we can see
that most of them are aligned with economic theory and intuition (see Table A3 in the
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appendix). For example, being native is positively correlated with child work, meaning
that being a member of a traditionally dispossessed sector as an indigenous group would
imply that the children in school age need to work to support their family expenditures.
Another characteristic that is negatively correlated with child work is to be enrolled in a
private school, because this implies an extra cost that only a wealthy family can afford.
So far, our results show that the policy change implied a child labor reduction only
in the secondary-age cohort. As we have stated before, the policy change may have had
different effects over household’s education decisions. The sizable lump-sum could have
helped the households to ease potential financial restrictions, and in this way the policy
change could negatively impact attendance or caused an increase in child labor. On the
other hand, the monthly cash transfer implied a change towards a continuous stream of
additional income (despite being smaller), and the households could have incorporated
this component of certainty in their expenditure decisions. Our results are more consistent
with the second possibility, as we have established that the policy change triggered a
reduction of child labor, in the secondary-school cohort. These results are consistent with
the evidence regarding cash transfers, regarding increased school attendance (Edmonds,
2006; Akresh et al., 2013) and reduced child labor (Gee, 2010; de Silva and Sumarto,
2015; Edmonds and Schady, 2012).
2.4.3.2 Falsification tests
To assure that the effect of the policy change of RD/BONOSOL have affected the out-
comes only between years 2007 and 2008 (years in which the policy change occurred), it
would be useful to test a placebo policy change before and after the true policy change, in
order to verify that for these periods the outcomes have not changed in the same direction
than in the 2007/2008 period. This is one possibility of the so-called “falsification tests”
(Gertler et al., 2016).
The testing procedure consists in estimating the marginal effects of nonexistent policy
changes immediately before and after the BONOSOL/RD policy change. By evaluating
these possibilities, we can discard that other factors apart from the policy change triggered
the change in the educational outcomes.
We estimate the following equation, based in the DiD including covariates model:
yih = β0+β1yearih+β2Treatmentih+β3yearih ·Treatmentih+γ ·Xih+ψ ·Zih+ih (2.3)
Where Treatmentih here refers to a dummy variable for households in which a recipient
lives (BONOSOL recipients in 2006 and 2007 and RD recipients in 2008 and 2009),
yearih considers either 2007 or 2009 (depending on which period -immediately before or
immediately after- we are considering) and covariates are the same as of the DiD and
covariates model.
Table 2.6 outlines the marginal effects for these periods18, which are estimated fol-
lowing the same procedure as in Equation 2.2.
The fact that all except one of the estimated marginal effects are statistically non-
significant is supportive of the results from the estimation of Equation 2.2. The marginal
18Complete results from the regression model are available in the appendix (Table A4.
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Table 2.6: Marginal effects from the falsification test
Attend Labor
Primary Secondary Whole Primary Secondary Whole
Before policy change
ATET -0.000 -0.031 -0.016 0.027 0.018 0.024
F-test 0.002 2.750 1.715 0.203 0.155 0.326
p-value 0.961 0.098 0.191 0.652 0.694 0.568
After policy change
ATET -0.001 -0.010 -0.005 0.014 0.042 0.034
F-test 0.847 0.420 0.461 0.081 0.622 0.667
p-value 0.358 0.517 0.497 0.776 0.431 0.415
∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Source: own estimations using EH 2006-2007 and EH 2008-2009
effect of the policy change on attendance in the secondary cohort is statistically significant
in the period before the policy change (2006-2007), although the coefficient is negative.
However, this result does not invalidates our previous results with respect to the marginal
effect of the policy change in the attendance rate. Given that the estimated marginal
effect was positive, the negative marginal effect before the policy change actually imply
that the policy change has been sufficiently strong to revert the potential tendency of
this variable.
Jointly, the results from the placebo confirm the main results for the policy change
between 2007 and 2008. The modification of BONOSOL into a monthly pension seem to
have had consequences for working activities of children living in households subject to
the policy change between 2007 and 2008 (specifically for the secondary school cohort).
2.4.3.3 Alternative control groups
Another possibility to test the robustness of our results would be to pick a control group
sufficiently close to the treatment group (regarding to the variable that defines the bound-
ary between both groups). In this case, that variable is the age: we defined the treatment
group as those children living with pensioners (equal or more than 65 years old in 2007),
so they were subject to the policy change in 2008. In that sense, as an additional ro-
bustness check we selected the control group as those not receiving the pension (i.e., the
eldest family member having less than 65 years old in 2007), but somehow closer to this
age threshold (for example, people which had 55 to 60 years old in 2007).
Accordingly, we restricted our control group according to two possible thresholds: 1)
the eldest person living in the household being from 55 to strictly less than 60 years old in
2007 (control group A); and ii) the eldest person living in the household being from 50 to
strictly less than 60 years old in 2007 (control group B). By restricting the control groups
to these cohorts we try to control for potential unobservable characteristics that could
be closely correlated to the age of the eldest person living with the household, but that
is not sufficiently close to jump into the treatment group. In addition, to control those
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characteristics that are observable, we apply the DiD model using the same covariates
we include in the basic specification.
For the estimation of the DiD models we take into account the sample divided by age
cohort and present the results distinguishing between primary and secondary age groups.
Additionally, just as with the basic model, we take into account the fact that individuals
in the sample may not be independent from each other, so we cluster the standard errors
by the primary sampling unit (PSU). Then, we estimate the DiD model with covariates
using the new-defined alternative control groups A and B (complete results are available
in the appendix [Table A5]):
As we can see, the marginal effects corresponding to the child labor in the secondary
school cohort are statistically significant and the signs of the effect are coherent with our
previously estimated coefficient using the original control group. However, an additional
feature that emerges from the modified control groups is that the marginal effect corre-
sponding to the attendance is positive and statistically significant also for the secondary
cohort. The sign of the marginal effect is consistent with the marginal effect of the policy
change in child labor in the secondary cohort: while the policy change seems to have
increased the attendance of the young people to school, at the same time it implied a re-
duction of the same group in working activities. Both marginal effects are observed using
the alternative control group (Panel B). The robustness checks we applied are consistent
with the main result that the policy change implied a reduction of the child labor in the
secondary cohort and an increase in the attendance to the school.
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Table 2.7: Marginal effects and OLS estimates for alternative control groups
Panel A: control group from 55 to 59 years old
Attend Labor
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Treatment −0.009 0.003 0.004 0.016
(0.009) (0.019) (0.052) (0.048)
2008 year dummy −0.007 0.025 0.008 −0.037
(0.008) (0.021) (0.061) (0.048)
Treatment*year dummy 0.012 0.013 −0.001 −0.055
(0.009) (0.027) (0.069) (0.066)
ATET 0.005 0.038∗ 0.007 −0.092∗
F-test 1.087 3.615 0.027 3.511
p-value 0.298 0.058 0.870 0.062
Observations 605 833 529 833
R2 0.044 0.067 0.424 0.375
Panel B: control group from 50 to 59 years old
Attend Labor
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Treatment −0.008 −0.010 −0.009 −0.003
(0.008) (0.016) (0.045) (0.043)
2008 year dummy −0.003 0.010 −0.094∗∗ −0.041
(0.004) (0.012) (0.044) (0.035)
Treatment*year dummy 0.009 0.028 0.094 −0.050
(0.006) (0.021) (0.058) (0.057)
ATET 0.005 0.038∗∗ −0.000 −0.092∗
F-test 1.161 4.095 0.000 3.463
p-value 0.282 0.044 0.995 0.063
Observations 910 1,336 803 1,336
R2 0.033 0.053 0.393 0.364
∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the PSU (primary sampling unit) level.
The dependent variable is measured at the individual level. The included controls are: if the children
attends to a private school, a first-born dummy, gender, native status, and the interaction between both
(measured at the individual level), as well as household controls.
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2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we evaluate the potential effect that an unexpected policy change on a cash
transfer to the elderly in Bolivia could have in school attendance and working activities
of the children living with recipients of the transfer. Using matching techniques and a
difference-in-difference methodology, we show that the change from a sizable yearly lump
sum transfer to a much smaller monthly installment had a positive effect in the attendance
rate and a negative one in child labor. The positive results have a bias towards older
children: the effect of the policy change is statistically significant only for youth being
in the secondary school (12 to 18 years old). We applied various robustness checks to
reinforce the evidence presented by the main model, and we can claim that our results
are specific to the period of the policy change. In this sense, the policy change seem to
have had an overall beneficial effect over some educational outcomes, namely increased
school attendance and reduced child labor activities.
Considering the monthly and yearly transfers, there is not a priori judgment about
which of the schemes would be preferable. The empirical evidence is mixed with respect
to a regular even small stream of income in counterpart to a rather big but long-interval
lump sum transfer. Our results show that a monthly transfer could serve better the aim
of getting children to keep going to the school, most probably due to the stability and
continuity of the transfers, a result which have some support from the revised empirical
evidence. While a sizable lump-sum transfer provides an important amount of money that
could be used as a start-up capital, households might put more value on the regularity of
the cash flows, by investing more in education after the policy change. Results regarding
child labor, specifically in the secondary-cohort, support this evidence.
Possibly the potential of a sizable yearly transfer is more important when we con-
sider other type of investments that households afford. In this sense, it is plausible that
the potential use of the big lump sum could be more beneficial if we consider produc-
tive investments (i.e. investing in a small business or in acquiring productive assets).
In this sense, future research could explore these possibilities by examining the relation-
ship regarding timing of cash transfers and productive or other type of household-driven
investments.
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CHAPTER
THREE
INCREASED DECENTRALIZATION, BASIC SERVICES,
AND NUTRITION: EVIDENCE FROM BOLIVIA
3.1 Introduction
Economic situation in Bolivia has progressed dramatically in the last 20 years. Besides
economic growth (i.e., the increase of GDP), social indicators have also improved, in
particular for the poor. For example, Eid and Aguirre (2013) finds that inequality in
Bolivia has fallen 13 points (from 0.59 to 0.46 in the Gini coefficient) between 1999 and
2011, outperforming any other country in Latin America in terms of inequality reduction.
Vargas and Garriga (2015) highlights poverty reduction (from 33.7 in 1996 to 16.2 percent
in 2011, using a poverty line of USD2.5/day), a sustained macroeconomic stability (annual
inflation rate was around 5% on average), and a favorable fiscal situation, by sustaining
fiscal surpluses from 2006 to 2014.
Despite this remarkable progress, there are important gaps that the country still
needs to address. For example, according to last census (2012), only 40% of the population
in the rural area have access to safe water (tap water), while the remaining 60% gets the
water from unsafe or non-permanent sources (wells, rivers, or rain water). Regarding
sanitation, 62% of rural households do not have access to any proper toilet facility. This
lack of access carries potential negative consequences in health (particularly for pregnant
women and small children), by the appearance of infectious diseases and inadequate
absorption of nutrients (Sturzenegger et al., 2016). The scenario adds the threat of
perpetuating the vicious circle of poverty (that is, less access to safe water and sanitation
leads to inadequate nutrition in childhood and thus to less productivity in adult age).
Nutrition is another area in which improvement is needed. For example, according to
International Food Policy Research Institute (2016) and United Nations (2015), Bolivia
outperforms only the poorest country in the region (Haiti) in terms of children nourish-
ment. While the country has accomplished the goal of reducing chronic undernourishment
at the national level, in the rural area this goal is still far from being fulfilled (UDAPE,
2015b). There are also significant differences among regions of the country, with some of
them showing impressive development, while others have scarcely shown progress. This
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dissimilarity indicates that the improvement in some of the most important indicators
has been heterogeneous.
What is role of government in the economic and social indicators’ improvement
in the last 20 years?. The answer to this question is complex, as it entails not only
disentangling the role of central government as responsible for public policy (e.g. by
framing the macroeconomic policy), but also the role of local/regional governments in
the well-being of their constituencies. As mentioned, progress in the access to public
services has been uneven considering a rural/urban or east/west distinction. This is
related with the level of decentralization, or to up to what point the local governments
can act to ensure economic and social progress of the citizens living in a given territory
within a country.
This chapter addresses the role of increased decentralization on the progress of key
social indicators, such as child nutrition, safe water and sanitation. As a related question,
it would be worth to investigate up to what extent this intervention has been pro-poor,
that is, if has benefited more to the poor than to the non-poor.
The evidence of the impact of decentralization on poverty and poverty-related out-
comes is broad, but not conclusive (see, among others, Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev,
2009; Birner and von Braun, 2015; Ahmad and Brosio, 2009). In addition, many authors
have tried to analyze the relationship between decentralization and poverty reduction or
intermediate outcomes (e.g. Ahlin and Mo¨rk, 2008; Galiani et al., 2008; Soto et al., 2012)
but no study, to the best of my knowledge, has evaluated the impact of decentraliza-
tion on nutrition improvement. In this sense, this chapter aims to fill that gap in the
literature.
The chapter is divided into the following parts: Section 2 formulates the conceptual
framework, Section 3 explores the existing empirical evidence of the impact of decen-
tralization on poverty and poverty-related outcomes and Section 4 reviews the Bolivian
decentralization process and the latest relevant developments associated with this reform.
Sections 5 and 6 describe the data and present the empirical strategy. Sections 7 presents
the results of the estimation and propose various robustness checks. Finally, Section 8
concludes.
3.2 Conceptual framework
In a broad sense, the process of decentralization entails the transfer of the tasks and
duties19 from the central government to a lower-level (regional or local) government tier.
In theory, by having a better local knowledge about their constituencies’ necessities,
the local authorities could offer local public goods and services more efficiently than
the central government would do. This preconception made decentralization a popular
reform. Dillinger (1994) reports that already in the 90s decade over 80% of developing
and transition countries were delegating responsibilities to local governments.
The “transfer of tasks” concept is extremely simplified. In fact, the decentralization
process is a complex undertaking that involves various dimensions. There is a convention
19The functions transferred ranges from the administration of local schools and hospitals, to the
provision of water services and waste management.
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in the literature (see Birner and von Braun, 2015; Schneider, 2003, among others) to
distinguish among three dimensions of decentralization. The first is the political dimen-
sion, which implies the assignment of certain governance processes (e.g. hold elections
to choose local authorities). Further, the administrative dimension entails the transfer-
ence of capabilities (mainly institutional capacity through human resources) to the local
tiers of government. Finally, the fiscal dimension involves the assignment of economic
resources from the central administration to the local governments, so they can afford
the provision of local public goods.
Thus, decentralization could be seen as a policy innovation to improve the role of
the central administration by introducing intergovernmental competition within smaller
regional units. In addition, it establishes checks and balances amongst lower levels of
government and ensures civil society participation in the policy decision-making process.
Advocates of decentralization argue that it is a way to bring near the government to
the people, and in this sense improves the demand and supply of public goods, which
in theory should be more efficient at the local level (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1998) in
contrast to provision by the central government.
Birner and von Braun (2015) point that decentralization should not be an achieve-
ment itself, but it could help to pursue desirable goals due to supply and demand factors.
By supply factors, the authors refer to the ability of the decentralized level of government
to provide the public goods in a more efficient way. Demand factors imply the power of
constituencies to ask for public goods and oversee the behavior of local governments.
Thus, decentralization would involve a more efficient provision of local public goods
by governments, monitored by the regional constituencies. Then, an increase in the well-
being of the people living in provinces or towns would be expected, due to the proximity
of the government and the use of information about local preferences. Figure 3.1 helps
to have a better notion of the potential impacts of decentralization, by differencing them
among short, medium and long-term effects.
Figure 3.1: Potential impacts of decentralization over time
Short term impact
* Increase in efficiency.
* Better monitoring (e.g. possibility 
of “voice and vote”).
Medium term impact
* Better infrastructure.
* Improved access to public goods 
and services (e.g. safe water, 
sanitation, garbage collection).
Long term impact
* Better economic opportunities.
* Improved life conditions (e.g. 
better nutrition and health).
* Poverty reduction.
* Decrease in child mortality
Source: Own elaboration.
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Although decentralization entails shifting the choice and decisions over public in-
vestments and interventions to the local level, it does not automatically guarantee an
improvement in the provision of local public goods. For example, Mansuri and Rao
(2013) claim that more participation (beyond certain threshold) by local constituencies
would even harm welfare. For instance, if the voice and power to make decisions is given
to local organizations, they might miss the optimal use of the resources. This is the
case if local constituencies focus only in infrastructure (buildings, sidewalks, etc.), while
another pro-poor investments are (socially) more profitable (e.g. agricultural extension
services, access to credit and business opportunities, etc.). This scenario could be partic-
ularly harmful if it further involves corruption of the local authorities, added to the lack
of capacity of the citizens in controlling and overseeing the prioritized projects.
Finally, although local provision could enhance the access to local public goods,
decentralization does not imply that it will benefit to the poorest and marginalized. This
can be relevant in the presence of a lack of institutional capacity at the local level, and
if vulnerable local communities don’t have the ability or the incentives to demand more
and better services from their local government. In this sense, Birner and von Braun
(2015) mention that decentralization could also pose risks for the poorest by “cementing”
the poor outcomes by inefficient local authorities and nonexistent checks and balances.
3.3 Impact of decentralization: review of the litera-
ture
The evidence of the impact of decentralization on welfare is broad in terms of method-
ologies, outcomes, and indicators. On assessing decentralization, a common proxy for
decentralization relies on its fiscal dimension. Fiscal decentralization reflects to which
extent the central administration transfers economic resources to the local government
to finance their operations and provide public goods (Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2016;
Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2009; Panizza, 1999). In addition, decentralization
could be approximated considering their other dimensions (i.e., political and adminis-
trative). Political decentralization proxy could be whether elections are held locally, or
the proportion of people that takes part on them (Mookherjee, 2015). Meanwhile, ad-
ministrative decentralization might be measured using the number of public employees
working at the local level, normalized by the total working force or population (Ivanyna
and Shah, 2014).
In terms of the outcomes, studies focus on education, health, and services offered at
the local level, like sanitation, water, and waste management. Ahlin and Mo¨rk (2008)
study decentralization’s impact on education indicators in Sweden. The authors measure
decentralization taking into account the fiscal and political dimensions and find that
school spending and teacher density are more equally distributed after decentralization.
Meanwhile, Galiani et al. (2008) finds that administrative decentralization has a positive
effect on education quality in Argentina, but it benefited more to the non-poor.
Regarding healthcare, Montero-Granados et al. (2007) use the fiscal and adminis-
trative dimensions of decentralization, and concludes that it does not improve or even
affect negatively the convergence rate of healthcare. In Colombia, Soto et al. (2012)
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find that fiscal and administrative decentralization lead to a decrease in infant mortality
rates. However, this decrease is greater in non-poor municipalities, in comparison with
poor municipalities. Moreover, using a cross-country panel but similar dependent vari-
able, Jime´nez-Rubio (2011) and Robalino et al. (2001) find a positive and considerable
effect of (fiscal) decentralization on infant mortality. Considering a broader impact of
decentralization, Gemmell et al. (2013) use a cross-country panel dataset (OECD coun-
tries) and finds that fiscal decentralization does not have a definite impact on economic
growth. By the other hand, Baskaran and Feld (2013) finds that fiscal decentralization
has a negative but non-significant effect on economic growth.
The revised empirical evidence shows that the impact of decentralization on out-
comes like economic growth or child mortality is far from being conclusive. While the
impact of decentralization has focused on traditional locally-delivered services such as ed-
ucation, health, and waste collection, to the best of my knowledge no study has addressed
the relationship between decentralization and nutrition improvement as a key pro-poor
intermediate outcome. Adequate nutrition, especially at early ages, is important because
it helps to reduce child and infant mortality. Moreover, investments in nutrition boosts
future productivity, by improving cognitive capacities and reducing the probability of re-
peating grades at the school (Alderman et al., 2009). In this sense, investing in nutrition
becomes one of the most profitable social investments that public policy could achieve.
3.4 Decentralization in Bolivia
The Bolivian decentralization experience was in line with the global tendency to decen-
tralize the power of central governments. Before 1994, competencies to provide public
goods fell into the exclusive responsibility of the central government. On the other hand,
budget allocation was a discretionary attribute of the national administration, without
any clear criteria or guideline. Regarding the political perspective, few of the municipal-
ities held elections and the absenteeism rates were considerably high. Human resources
assigned to the municipalities were low, considering that the functions of this level of gov-
ernment were neither clearly defined nor held accountable. By all these characteristics,
Bolivia was considered one of the most centralized countries in the region (Faguet, 2004).
In 1994, the Bolivian government conducted a major reform aiming to restore power
to lower levels of the territory (municipalities), through the transfer of income and expen-
diture responsibilities. The reform provided additional attributions and functions to the
municipalities, in sectors like health and education. All the infrastructure of these sec-
tors (e.g. schools and municipal hospitals) was transferred to the municipal governments
for their administration. In the second place, the reform established that the elected
municipal authorities should supervise the performance of education and health workers.
In addition, the responsibility of building new local infrastructure (e.g. in sectors as
sanitation, water, and domestic roads) was transferred to each municipal government.
Some indicators of the reform are summarized in Table 3.1, which shows the impact
in the delegation of resources and responsibilities to the municipal governments in Bolivia.
As can be seen, the shift from the centralized state model to a decentralized one has been
impressive in terms of distributed revenues, local investment, and transfer of political
power.
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Table 3.1: Situation before and after decentralization reform in Bolivia
Indicators Before 1994 reform After 1994 reform
Beneficiaries Three cities perceived 90%
of resources
Rural area perceive 50% of
resources
Municipalities receiving
central govt. funds
61 311
Share of central govt. funds 10% 20%
Distribution Legal residence Population
Municipal investmenta 11% 20%
Social investmentb 1.72% 3.62%
Investment in education USD 10 million USD 30 million
Grassroots organizations Less than 100 More than 19,000
Towns holding elections 124 311
a As proportion of total investment
b As proportion of GDP
Source: Own elaboration based on Barja Daza et al. (2013) and Graham (1997)
Previous to the reform, not all the municipalities20 were legally recognized as ad-
ministrative units. In this sense, few of them were entitled to receive funding from the
central government, or to hold elections of local authorities. In this sense, the responsi-
bility to provide local public goods was entirely of the central government. This caused
the abandonment (in terms of access and delivery to basic services such as water and
sanitation) of the poorest and remotest areas in the country, and a completely lack of
accountability. Being subject of central government transfers allowed to the municipal
governments to invest in local public goods and to their authorities to be monitored by
local constituencies and evaluated through the elections.
From 1994 onwards, municipal investment as a percentage of total public investment
fluctuated between 14% and 36% (Figure 3.2). The behavior of public investment was
largely influenced by the economic cycle, and the cycle at the same was driven by the
external context (e.g., the Asian crisis from 1997-1999, and the advanced economies
slowdown in the beginning of the 2000s decade). From the mid-2000s, municipal public
investment recovered in great extent, reaching a peak of 36% of total investment in
2008. Again, due to harsh economic conditions imposed by the global recession of late-
2000s, municipal investment adjusted accordingly reaching a low record of 22% of total
investment in 2011.
Budgeting process in municipalities entail the elaboration of a participative plan
(POA, for its acronym in Spanish), which details all the prioritized investments that the
municipal authorities are requested to make during the year. In this sense, all the local
investment is financed using municipal government revenues. Those are composed of: i)
own revenues, mainly taxes to real estate and vehicles; and ii) transfers from the central
government, distributed according to the number of inhabitants of the municipalities. A
maximum of 20% of total revenues can be used for recurrent expenditures (e.g. salaries
of local authorities, office supplies, etc.), while the remaining 80% is to be used in in-
20Municipalities are administrative unites smaller than provinces.
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Figure 3.2: Total and municipal public investment in Bolivia
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vestments (mainly infrastructure). Distribution of revenues for municipal governments is
shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Distribution of municipal revenues (in millions of Bs.
and in percentages)
1996 2001 2012
Millions % Millions % Millions %
Own revenues 193 8 900 33 1,695 10
Transfers 1,865 82 1,105 41 12,169 74
Other revenues 224 10 723 27 2,589 16
Total 2,282 100 2,728 100 16,453 100
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Ministry of Finance. Sum of
percentages may differ from 100 due to rounding.
Considering the figures from Table 3.2, revenues of municipal governments increased
noticeably in the 2000s decade. While this has to do with the favorable economic situation
in Bolivia especially in the second half of 2000s decade (and thus an increase in the tax
revenue that has to be distributed to the municipal governments), most of this increase is
due to the extraordinary revenues earned by the central government coming from natural
gas exports. Indeed, the increase in the international prices of fuels from a low USD 25
per barrel in 2001 to their maximum average in 2008 (USD 99.25) implied an almost
fourfold growth in government revenues, ranging from Bs 16 thousand millions in 2001
to 87 thousand millions in 2012 (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: Central government revenues and price of oil (WTI)
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While dependence from central government transfers has reduced from 1996 to 2001,
this tendency reversed in 2012, in which 74% of municipal revenues came from the center.
The situation of dependence from the central government is even more dramatic for non-
capital municipalities (i.e., small municipalities far from the most populated cities in the
country), where the dependence rate have increased from 60% (2001) to 80% (2012).
There have been various attempts to evaluate the decentralization policy, especially
in its fiscal dimension (i.e., the increase of fiscal transfers from the central government
to municipal governments). For example, Gray Molina (2004) explores the impact of
decentralization reform in poverty reduction between 1992 and 2001 using census data21.
The author uses 3 types of explanatory variables for poverty reduction: i) social invest-
ments (main variable), ii) political variables22, and iii) demographic controls. The study
finds that social investments are positively and significantly related to poverty reduction,
after controlling for demographic variables. Gray Molina (2004) also finds that political
fragmentation (measured as mayor23 turnover for each municipality) affects negatively
to poverty reduction, although the impact of social investment remains positive and sta-
tistically significant. A drawback of the study is that it does not address the potential
problem of endogeneity between poverty reduction and decentralization. Andersen and
Jemio (2016) shows that the system of intergovernmental transfers implied by the decen-
tralization design has a positive and statistically significant impact on poverty reduction,
as measured by the Unmet Basic Needs (UBN) criteria.
Ayo (2010) tries to evaluate if decentralization reform in Bolivia benefited the most
vulnerable groups in Bolivia. He concludes that the poor have benefited from decentral-
ization, but less than the non-poor. Nonetheless, this conclusion comes from qualitative
evidence only (interviews and surveys to local authorities), and in this way could not be
assessed as rigorous in order to find out the actual impact of decentralization on poverty
alleviation.
Faguet (2004) shows that decentralization reform in Bolivia allowed matching the
people preferences’ in municipalities with the public investment at that level after the
reform. In other words, municipalities that fall short in sectors as education and health
experienced greater public investment in the sectors they required most. In that sense,
this evidence is a positive test of the matching local preferences with the investment
that decentralization supposedly brings. However, Barja Daza et al. (2013) arrive at a
different conclusion, stating that municipal governments are aligned to central government
interests and policies, at the expense of local necessities. The authors argue that this
result is derived from the lack of own resources by the municipal governments because
most of the revenues that a municipal government possesses are provided by the central
government24.
The most closely related study to this is Inchauste (2009), which explores the re-
lationship between decentralization and intermediate outcomes (education, health, and
infrastructure indicators) in Bolivia between years 2002 and 2005. The author finds no
21Census data does not include data on consumption, but instead the author uses this information to
build UBN (unsatisfied basic needs) indices, as a poverty proxy.
22Measured through the number of grassroots organizations and number of mayors in 1994-2000.
23That is, the person that leads the municipal government.
24With the exception of capitals of departments (regions), and bigger cities, which are capable to
collect enough local taxes (property tax) to fund their operations.
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strong evidence that the increase in municipal expenditures leads to an improvement of
social indicators. However, the study relies on household surveys to construct indicators
at the municipal level, without taking into consideration that the sampling process of the
Bolivian household surveys impede to draw conclusions over social indicators to this level
of disaggregation. In fact, only an urban/rural distinction is statistically representative
using the household surveys.
3.5 Data
Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics of the main variables, for the years 2001 and
2012. This study relies on household surveys and census data collected from the Bolivian
National Institute of Statistics; and on fiscal data coming from Ministry of Finance’s
administrative records. Using these sources, a panel of 314 local governments (munic-
ipalities) is built, for the indicated years. The reason for the time frame (2001, 2012)
relies on the fact that those are census years, which are needed to calculate nourishment
indicators at the municipal level. In that sense, variables as household size, population,
illiteracy rate and access to safe water and sanitation come from census data.
Table 3.3: Summary statistics
2001 2012
VARIABLES N Average SD Average SD
Population (habitants) 314 25,540 92,091 31,075 112,360
Indigenous proxy[1] (proportion) 314 0.51 0.35 0.44 0.32
Illiteracy (proportion) 314 0.23 0.13 0.09 0.06
Household size (members) 314 6 1 5 1
Proportion of rural households 314 0.81 0.28 0.75 0.31
Regional GDP (in millions of Bs.) 314 3,490 2,382 5,381 3,644
Investment (in millions of Bs.) 314 6.76 21.02 34.85 99.99
Transfers from central govt (Bs. Per person) 314 149 41.56 1503 1040
Number of hospitals 314 8 13 9 14
Number of schools 314 45 58 51 79
Access to toilet (proportion) 314 0.4 0.27 0.48 0.27
Access to safe water (proportion) 314 0.38 0.23 0.5 0.23
Probability of being underweight 314 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.02
Probability of being stunted 314 0.47 0.12 0.23 0.09
Source: Own elaboration based on information provided by UDAPE, National Institute of Statistics and
Ministry of Finance.
Nutrition information at the municipal levels is estimated through a combination of
two sources: census information, available for years 2001 and 2012; and Demographic
and Health Surveys (DHS) for 2003 and 2012. DHS are a rich source of information on
health and nutrition, which in combination with comprehensive census data allow the
estimation of nutrition and health status indicators at local scale (for applications see
Zhao and Lanjouw, 2002; Ebener et al., 2015; Fujii, 2005).
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Fiscal indicators regarding municipal revenues and expenditures come from admin-
istrative data. The dataset includes information about municipal revenues (own tax
revenues and transfers from the central government) collected from the Ministry of Fi-
nance. Geographical information (area, altitude, slope and distance to the sea) comes
from data compiled in UDAPE (2015a).
3.5.1 Measuring decentralization
It is important to delve into the rationale for the choice of the decentralization measures.
First, while is difficult to find a single variable that embraces the multidimensional nature
of decentralization (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2009), it would be useful to split
the concept into their fiscal, administrative and political dimensions. In this research,
the focus relies on the fiscal perspective of decentralization, but other dimensions of the
decentralization process will be considered, as mitigating or increasing the impact via
interaction effects.
In the available literature, decentralization has often been measured as the per-
centage of revenues or expenditure of municipal government out of the total revenues
(expenditure) of the whole public sector (Panizza, 1999). Arzaghi and Henderson (2005)
measure fiscal centralization by using the ratio of central government in total govern-
ment consumption expenditures, so this implies that decentralization could be measured
as the ratio of local government expenditure (revenue) in total government expenditure
(revenue). Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009) adopts a similar view, by using the
share of revenue or expenditures that are transferred to local governments. Finally, Soto
et al. (2012) affirms that the subnational share of government revenue (or expenditure)
is the most commonly used measure of fiscal decentralization. Accordingly, I use the
share of transfers that each municipality receives, over the total revenue of the central
government, as the main proxy for the degree of fiscal decentralization.
The reason for choosing this indicator relies on the fact that a significant increase
in the transfer share would enable to the municipal government to make more invest-
ments and provide better and/or greater access to public goods, which in turn implies
an improvement in nutritional status of children. As an alternative but related measure
of fiscal decentralization, I use the municipal expenditure share (out of total government
expenditure), under the same logic for the increased revenues. Increased expenditure
could allow the municipal authorities to increase the access to public goods, improving
their citizen’s welfare.
Figure 3.4 shows the fiscal decentralization proxies (i.e., the transfer share and the
expenditure share) in the 314 municipalities in Bolivia. As it can be seen, there is a
noticeable geographic variability, and a general increase of the revenues (via transfers)
and expenditures in 2012. It is also clear, however, that expenditure data is missing in
some of the municipalities in 2001 (98 out of 314 observations for that year). In this sense,
I rely primarily in the transfer share as the main fiscal decentralization proxy variable.
While the expenditure and revenue share measures are relevant for a broad measure of
welfare (such as nourishment), in the case of access to safe water and sanitation a “more
focused” indicator of increased investment/expenditure is used. In this sense, in the
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Figure 3.4: Transfer and expenditure shares
Transfer share 2001 Transfer share 2012
(.1,2.5]
(.05,.1]
(.01,.05]
[0,.01]
Expenditure share 2001 Expenditure share 2012
(.1,3.5]
(.05,.1]
(.01,.05]
[0,.01]
No data
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Ministry of Finance. The definition
of the variables are provided in Table 3.4
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models explaining the access to safe water and sanitation, the expenditure in sanitation
expressed as a share of total expenditure is utilized as the main decentralization variable.
Regarding the other dimensions of decentralization, administrative decentralization
is proxied using the proportion of public sector workers in the total workforce, per mu-
nicipality. Thus, municipalities with a greater number of public servants could in theory
be more effective providing local public goods. In addition, political decentralization is
evaluated using the elections’ participation in each municipality (voters over population
entitled to vote in local elections). In addition, two measures are used to account for
potential synergies of fiscal decentralization and political variables: the winning share
of the local authorities, and a dummy variable that indicates if the local government is
aligned with the central government (same political party). The winning share would be
important as it could indicate the degree of consensus in each municipality (i.e., a greater
winning share would indicate greater political support and accountability, as suggested by
Loayza et al., 2014), while the dummy for political alignment could reflect coordination
between central and local governments. Table 3.4 details the variables that are used for
the estimations.
3.6 Empirical strategy
In order to link decentralization to the described outcomes (nutrition, water, and sanita-
tion), the following equation is estimated using OLS:
ymt = αm + γ0 · d2012t + φ · Xmt + β · Zmt + mt (3.1)
Where ymt is the outcome of interest (nutrition and access to sanitation and safe
water) in municipality m and year t, αm are municipality fixed effects, d2012t is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one for the year 2012, Xmt is the main variable of interest
(fiscal decentralization measure) in each municipality m in years 2001 and 2012 and Zmt
is a matrix of covariates. Based on Inchauste (2009), the covariates I use are the average
family size, a proxy for the share of indigenous population and the average illiteracy
rate per municipality. Additional covariates include the regional GDP25 and municipality
population. These variables are included to account for general economic performance
at the local level (regional GDP), and because population is the main determinant of
fiscal transfers. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level are used in the
estimations, to control for potential outcome correlation within provinces.
In addition to the estimation of Equation 3.1, and in order to evaluate the potential
interaction between different types of decentralization, I estimate the following equation:
ymt = αm + γ0 · d2012t + φ · Xmt + δ · Xmt · gmt + ζ · gmt + β · Zmt + mt (3.2)
In which gmt are the political and administrative variables interacting with fiscal
decentralization measures (based on the transfers from the central government and total
25Regional GDP varies by department, which encompasses a number of municipalities. In Bolivia,
there are 9 departments with an average of 35 municipalities per department.
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Table 3.4: Variables used in the estimation
Variable type and name Description
Dependent
Access to water Proportion of households with access to safe
water for drinking and cooking (tapped water)
Access to sanitation Proportion of households with access to a toi-
let (exclusive or shared)
Stunting Proportion of stunted children (chronic mal-
nutrition, or low height for age in children less
than 5 years old)
Underweight Proportion of underweight children (acute
malnutrition, or low weight for age in children
less than 5 years old)
Fiscal decentralization indicators
Transfer share transfer to municipalitymTotal central government revenues [log]
Expenditure share expendituremTotal central government expenditures [log]
Focused expenditure share expenditure in sanitationmTotal central government expenditures [log]
Additional political and administrative
indicators
Political decentralization proxy number of persons votingmtotal number of persons allowed to votem
Administrative decentralization proxy number of persons working in public administrationmtotal number of workersm
Political support Winning share of elected authorities, per mu-
nicipality
Political alignment Dummy variable [=1 if ruling party in munic-
ipality m is the same as the ruling party in
central government]
Controls
Rural Proportion of households that live in rural area
Indigenous proxy Dummy for indigenous status [=1 if person has
learned to talk in indigenous (non-Spanish nor
foreign) language]
Illiteracy Average illiteracy rate
Household size Average household size
Population Number of habitants [log]
Regional GDP Regional GDP [log]
Note: Subscript m indicates variation over municipalities. Regional GDP varies over department
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and focused municipal expenditures). All the other variables remain as detailed in the
estimation of Equation 3.1.
3.7 Results
3.7.1 Water and sanitation
Table 3.5 shows the results from the model estimation with access to safe water as the
dependent variable and the focused expenditure as the fiscal decentralization proxy. Col-
umn 1 of the table shows the base model (Equation 3.1) without interaction of the fiscal
decentralization measure with the administrative and political variables, while columns
2 to 5 show the estimation of the model with the interactions (Equation 3.2).
From the results, the effect of the expenditure in sanitation on access to safe water
is statistically non-significant in all the estimated models. The lack of significant results
suggests that despite the increase in the revenues to the municipalities in the period 2001-
2012, investment in sanitation seems to have no effect in the access to safe water, after
taking into account other potentially confounding factors. The lack of infrastructure and
the high levels of investment needed to improve them might have made an additional safe
water or toilet connection non-feasible or unprofitable, especially in less populated and
remote areas. In fact, this is confirmed by the sign and significance of the coefficient on
the rural proportion of households.
Similarly, municipalities with a higher rate of illiteracy have less access to safe water.
This result is expected, given that illiteracy is related to multidimensional poverty and
the absence of future opportunities. The coefficient on population is negatively correlated
to the access to safe water, suggesting congestion in the use of this service/resource.
Indeed, as the population of municipalities goes larger, there is competition over the
use of limited goods and services, one of these being the access to water. This issue is
of growing importance, given the increased processes of urbanization especially in areas
near populous cities (Torres, 2008).
An interesting result emerges with the estimation of the model with interaction terms
between fiscal and political/administrative decentralization. The interaction coefficient
in column 5 implies that municipalities politically aligned with the central government
experienced an increase in access to safe water, given the increase of the expenditure in
water and sanitation. However, this result appears to be driven by major municipalities in
the sample, as the estimation of the model using a sample excluding main cities (capitals
of department and El Alto city26) results in a non-significant coefficient (although still
positive).
Table 3.6 shows the impact of an increase in decentralization (sanitation expenditure)
on the availability of toilet facilities. As in the case for access to safe water, the coefficients
corresponding to the sanitation expenditure are non-significant for all the specifications.
Some characteristics are predictably associated with the access to proper sanitation. For
example, municipalities with a higher degree of illiteracy tend to have less access to proper
26El Alto city is a satellite city next to La Paz (seat of government) and one of the most populous
cities in the country, after Santa Cruz (with population data for 2012).
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Table 3.5: FE OLS results, dependent variable=access to water
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expenditure share in sanitation 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.002 −0.004
(0.003) (0.020) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
Participation in elections −0.077
(0.402)
Expenditure share in sanitation · Participation in elections −0.001
(0.030)
Share of public workers(log) 0.013
(0.038)
Expenditure share in sanitation · Share of public workers(log) 0.001
(0.003)
Voter’s support 0.059
(0.205)
Expenditure share in sanitation · Voter’s support 0.007
(0.017)
Political alignment=1 0.118
(0.079)
Political alignment=1 · Expenditure share in sanitation 0.012*
(0.006)
Rural −0.294***−0.294***−0.241***−0.294***−0.275***
(0.075) (0.076) (0.057) (0.074) (0.081)
Indigenous proxy 0.260* 0.246 0.208 0.229 0.221
(0.154) (0.155) (0.143) (0.165) (0.154)
Illiteracy −0.534***−0.552***−0.549***−0.547***−0.583***
(0.134) (0.146) (0.126) (0.150) (0.126)
Household size −0.008 −0.006 −0.001 −0.006 −0.001
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Population(log) −0.174***−0.185***−0.130***−0.181***−0.182***
(0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047)
Regional GDP(log) 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.173*** 0.182*** 0.185***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.064)
Year 2012 dummy −0.033 −0.022 −0.031 −0.028 −0.034
(0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Observations 480 480 478 480 480
R2 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. Variables described in Table 3.4
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sanitation (negative sign in columns 2, 4 and 5). This is not surprising, provided that the
lack of formal education is one of the main characteristics of marginalization (von Braun
and Gatzweiler, 2014). In addition, regional GDP is positively associated with access to
sanitation, reflecting that improving economic conditions could have helped to increase
service delivery in the municipalities.
3.7.2 Nutrition indicators
Table 3.7 shows the results of the regression model considering the proportion of under-
weight children as the dependent variable, with the transfer share as the fiscal decentral-
ization indicator. The results also include the model with interaction terms. A negative
sign of the decentralization variables is expected, meaning a reduction in the proportion
of underweight children as a consequence of increased fiscal decentralization.
The transfers share seem to have a consistent effect on the average proportion of
underweight children in the period 2001-2012, on almost all the specifications. Column
1 implies that an increase in the transfer share of 1% would decrease the proportion of
underweight children in -0.0003 percentage points. While this effect seems to be almost
negligible, the increase in the transfer share during the 2000s decade needs to be taken
into account (which was 93% [median]). Considering this, the implied decrease in the
proportion of underweight children would be approximately 2.79 percentage points (93 x
0.0003).
Table 3.8 shows the results of the model using the expenditure side of fiscal decen-
tralization. The effect of the fiscal decentralization proxy is noticeable smaller and less
uniform amongst specifications. Indeed, the model without decentralization interactions
(column 1) implies that, given a median 73% increase in the expenditure share from
year 2001 to 2012, the decrease in the proportion of underweight children was approxi-
mately one percentage point. The models including the interaction terms (columns 2-5)
shows that either the fiscal decentralization proxy has no statistically significant effect,
or that the impact is very small (column 5 imply a decrease of 1 percentage point in the
proportion of underweight children).
Regarding the proportion of stunted children as the dependent variable, Table 3.9
shows the results from the estimation using the transfer share as the fiscal decentralization
proxy. The results also confirm that increased fiscal decentralization is associated with
a reduction in the proportion of stunted children. The model in column 1 implies that
the median increase in the transfer share of 93% decreased the proportion of stunted
children in 5 percentage points. In turn, column 3 results implies that the effect of a 1%
increase in the transfer share is associated with a reduction of 0.00102 percentage points
in the proportion of stunted children, but the effect is reinforced when the share of public
officials also increases. Figure 3.5 depicts the marginal effect of an increase in the transfer
share given different levels of the share of public officials by municipality. Clearly, when
there is high share of public officials (dotted line), the fiscal decentralization is more
“effective” (i.e., the slope of the line is more pronounced). Conversely, if the share of
public officials is low (continuous line), the increase in fiscal decentralization is almost
flat.
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Table 3.6: FE OLS results, dependent variable=access to sanitation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expenditure share in sanitation 0.003 0.012 0.027 0.005 0.001
(0.004) (0.018) (0.020) (0.008) (0.006)
Participation in elections −0.485
(0.364)
Expenditure share in sanitation · Participation in elections −0.017
(0.028)
Share of public workers(log) 0.086
(0.055)
Expenditure share in sanitation · Share of public workers(log) 0.006
(0.005)
Voter’s support −0.094
(0.209)
Expenditure share in sanitation · Voter’s support −0.006
(0.017)
Political alignment=1 0.013
(0.077)
Political alignment=1 · Expenditure share in sanitation 0.002
(0.006)
Rural −0.048 −0.042 −0.034 −0.042 −0.041
(0.061) (0.065) (0.066) (0.061) (0.064)
Indigenous proxy 0.141 0.086 0.146 0.125 0.121
(0.131) (0.124) (0.125) (0.129) (0.130)
Illiteracy −0.198 −0.275** −0.192 −0.228* −0.236*
(0.120) (0.124) (0.118) (0.136) (0.124)
Household size −0.033 −0.026 −0.027 −0.032 −0.030
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Population(log) −0.023 −0.068* −0.025 −0.026 −0.025
(0.040) (0.040) (0.046) (0.039) (0.040)
Regional GDP(log) 0.096** 0.093** 0.080* 0.091** 0.089**
(0.039) (0.040) (0.047) (0.039) (0.043)
Year 2012 dummy −0.008 0.036 0.005 −0.003 −0.009
(0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Observations 480 480 478 480 480
R2 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.46
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. Variables described in Table 3.4
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Table 3.7: FE OLS results, dependent variable=underweight (transfer share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transfers share(log) −0.030***−0.043** −0.018 −0.031***−0.031***
(0.008) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009)
Participation in elections 0.148
(0.258)
Transfers share(log) · Participation in elections 0.018
(0.025)
Share of public workers(log) 0.013
(0.035)
Transfers share(log) · Share of public workers(log) 0.002
(0.004)
Voter’s support 0.023
(0.110)
Transfers share(log) · Voter’s support 0.002
(0.011)
Political alignment=1 0.007
(0.037)
Political alignment=1 · Transfers share(log) 0.001
(0.004)
Rural 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.012 0.013
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Indigenous proxy 0.025 0.026 0.015 0.026 0.021
(0.068) (0.067) (0.076) (0.074) (0.070)
Illiteracy 0.110 0.102 0.108 0.116 0.102
(0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.072) (0.081)
Household size 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.010
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Population(log) 0.024 0.025 0.018 0.025 0.024
(0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Regional GDP(log) −0.023 −0.023 −0.023 −0.022 −0.024
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Year 2012 dummy 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.023
(0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Observations 628 628 623 628 628
R2 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. Variables described in Table 3.4
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Table 3.8: FE OLS results, dependent variable=underweight (expenditure share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expenditures share(log) −0.014* −0.022 −0.025 −0.014 −0.015*
(0.007) (0.021) (0.019) (0.008) (0.009)
Participation in elections 0.153
(0.287)
Expenditures share(log) · Participation in elections 0.013
(0.026)
Share of public workers(log) −0.043
(0.038)
Expenditures share(log) · Share of public workers(log) −0.003
(0.004)
Voter’s support −0.014
(0.104)
Expenditures share(log) · Voter’s support −0.000
(0.010)
Political alignment=1 0.004
(0.031)
Political alignment=1 · Expenditures share(log) 0.000
(0.004)
Rural 0.004 0.001 −0.008 0.006 0.004
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Indigenous proxy −0.032 −0.029 −0.037 −0.043 −0.031
(0.091) (0.090) (0.102) (0.099) (0.094)
Illiteracy 0.102 0.108 0.094 0.093 0.103
(0.089) (0.091) (0.088) (0.079) (0.095)
Household size 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Population(log) 0.014 0.022 0.007 0.013 0.014
(0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Regional GDP(log) −0.008 −0.009 0.006 −0.011 −0.008
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Year 2012 dummy −0.002 −0.010 −0.008 0.002 −0.001
(0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019)
Observations 530 530 525 530 530
R2 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.19
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. Variables described in Table 3.4
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Table 3.9: FE OLS results, dependent variable=stunting (transfer share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transfers share(log) −0.057***−0.051 −0.102***−0.031* −0.059***
(0.015) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017) (0.018)
Participation in elections −0.029
(0.383)
Transfers share(log) · Participation in elections −0.007
(0.040)
Share of public workers(log) −0.118
(0.076)
Transfers share(log) · Share of public workers(log) −0.012*
(0.007)
Voter’s support −0.489***
(0.171)
Transfers share(log) · Voter’s support −0.055***
(0.017)
Political alignment=1 0.011
(0.067)
Political alignment=1 · Transfers share(log) 0.002
(0.008)
Rural 0.051 0.049 0.024 0.037 0.052
(0.047) (0.046) (0.051) (0.048) (0.047)
Indigenous proxy −0.050 −0.050 −0.031 0.024 −0.054
(0.114) (0.114) (0.120) (0.122) (0.118)
Illiteracy 0.650*** 0.660*** 0.681*** 0.585*** 0.643***
(0.119) (0.130) (0.119) (0.111) (0.130)
Household size 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.082*** 0.088***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Population(log) −0.012 −0.010 −0.027 −0.016 −0.013
(0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033)
Regional GDP(log) 0.057 0.057 0.075* 0.064 0.056
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043)
Year 2012 dummy 0.056 0.051 0.046 0.040 0.057
(0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
Observations 628 628 623 628 628
R2 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.56
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. Variables described in Table 3.4
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Figure 3.5: Marginal effect of an increase in the transfer share, by public workers’
share
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On the other hand, the interaction between political support and fiscal decentraliza-
tion (column 4) is negative and statistically significant, reinforcing the effect of increased
fiscal decentralization in the reduction of the proportion of stunted children. Figure 3.6
shows the marginal effect of increased fiscal decentralization conditional on different lev-
els of political support (implied by the different slopes of the straight lines). In this case,
municipalities in which there has been higher electoral support prove to be more effective
in the reduction of stunted children provided an increase in fiscal decentralization27. Both
the reinforcing effect of the share of public officials and of the political support on fiscal
decentralization are robust to the exclusion of major cities (capitals of department and El
Alto). In this sense, a major elected with high political support could be more pressed
to improve their constituencies’ welfare.
Illiteracy is again one of the most important factors that are negatively associated
with the probability of being stunted. In addition, household size appears to be a factor
contributing to the probability of being stunted. This association is expected, provided
that bigger families perhaps have more children and so they find difficult to fulfill their
nutritional requirements. Indeed, household size is a factor commonly associated with
poverty (Abebaw and Admassie, 2014).
27The reinforcing effect of political support and fiscal decentralization could be explained because the
local authorities (majors) are elected by simple majority. Hence, a major could even be elected by little
more than 10% (the minimum winning share in the sample was roughly 11%).
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Figure 3.6: Marginal effect of an increase in the transfer share, by political support
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Table 3.10 shows in turn the model for stunting with expenditure share as the de-
centralization proxy. The effect of increased fiscal decentralization by the expenditure
side seems to be weaker than from the revenue side. In effect, the model without interac-
tions (column 1) shows no impact of increased fiscal decentralization on the proportion of
stunted children. However, turning to the interaction between fiscal and other dimensions
of decentralization (administrative and political), the effect seem to be consistent with
the marginal effects from the transfer share model: both the share of public servants and
political support seem to reinforce the effect of increased fiscal decentralization on the
reduction of stunting. As with the model using the transfer share, household size and
illiteracy are positively correlated with the proportion of stunted children.
3.7.3 Heterogeneous effects by poverty status
Appropriate nutritional status and permanent access to safe water and sanitation are
crucial for everybody, but even more for the poorest. Inadequate nutritional status for
children imply the risk to fall in a poverty vicious circle (by limiting the development of
cognitive and intellectual abilities of children and young women). For that reason, it is
of special interest to take into account the distinction poor/non-poor when assessing the
impact of fiscal decentralization on water, sanitation and nourishment status.
Accordingly, I estimate a model based on the basic specification, with initial poverty
rates as the potential source of heterogeneous effects of increased fiscal decentralization.
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Table 3.10: FE OLS results, dependent variable=stunting (expenditure share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expenditures share(log) −0.020 0.022 −0.100***−0.004 −0.027
(0.015) (0.037) (0.036) (0.015) (0.018)
Participation in elections −0.389
(0.502)
Expenditures share(log) · Participation in elections −0.056
(0.055)
Share of public workers(log) −0.186**
(0.093)
Expenditures share(log) · Share of public workers(log) −0.020**
(0.009)
Voter’s support −0.442**
(0.175)
Expenditures share(log) · Voter’s support −0.049***
(0.017)
Political alignment=1 0.083
(0.068)
Political alignment=1 · Expenditures share(log) 0.010
(0.008)
Rural 0.033 0.046 −0.007 0.026 0.039
(0.061) (0.059) (0.068) (0.061) (0.057)
Indigenous proxy −0.141 −0.100 −0.116 −0.079 −0.119
(0.132) (0.137) (0.133) (0.139) (0.139)
Illiteracy 0.658*** 0.711*** 0.695*** 0.604*** 0.690***
(0.137) (0.148) (0.134) (0.127) (0.158)
Household size 0.098*** 0.101*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.102***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Population(log) −0.039 −0.031 −0.060* −0.047 −0.041
(0.033) (0.041) (0.034) (0.036) (0.033)
Regional GDP(log) 0.058 0.055 0.097** 0.061* 0.063
(0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.036) (0.040)
Year 2012 dummy 0.034 0.030 0.015 0.030 0.044
(0.040) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043)
Observations 530 530 525 530 530
R2 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.56
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. Variables described in Table 3.4
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Poverty rates for 2001 were calculated in INE (2003), using the small area methodology
and considering a monetary dimension of poverty. The estimated model is:
ymt = αm + δ0 · d2012t + φ1 · Xmt + φ2 · Xmt · poormt + β · Zmt + mt (3.3)
Where Xmt is the decentralization proxy according to ymt (that is, expenditure share
in water in sanitation for safe water and sanitation outcomes, and overall transfer and
expenditure shares in the case of nourishment indicators). The set of covariates remains
unchanged. To classify a municipality as “poor”, a threshold of 0.5 is used, so a munic-
ipality with an average poverty headcount of 50% or more is assigned the poor status
(poor=1)28.
The results of the estimation of Equation 3.3 are shown in Table 3.11, considering
the full specification (that is, municipal and year fixed-effects) using the four outcomes
(water, sanitation, underweight and stunting). The coefficient of interest is the interac-
tion of the poor dummy and the measures for fiscal decentralization. This coefficient is
statistically significant for the model explaining the stunting status (using both decen-
tralization measures, columns 4 and 6), reflecting that the progress has been lower for
the poorest municipalities.
To clarify the marginal effects, Figure 3.7 presents the predicted value for the pro-
portion of stunted children, differentiating the effect by poverty status. The figure shows
that, while increased decentralization decrease the probability of being stunted overall
(both poor and non-poor marginal effects have negative slopes), the non-poor progressed
more than poor, i.e., the slope of the non-poor is steeper in comparison with the poor
group, considering both the transfer and expenditure shares. The magnitude of the esti-
mated coefficients implies that, given an increase of 50% in the transfer share, the decrease
in the proportion of stunted children would be 1 percentage point for poor municipal-
ities, while for non-poor municipalities this decrease would be 4 percentage points. In
the case of expenditure share, given an increase in the share of 50%, the decrease in the
proportion of stunted children is 0.5 percentage points, while for non-poor municipalities
the decrease is 3 percentage points.
The result of “non pro-poorness” of increased fiscal decentralization is not depending
on an arbitrary choice for the threshold of 0.5. As a robustness check, equation 3 was
estimated using different thresholds for the poverty headcount (0.6 and 0.7). The signs
of the coefficients of the interaction terms using different thresholds remain positive, irre-
spective of the used threshold, meaning that the choice of the threshold is not influencing
the result of non-pro-poor characteristic of the increased transfers.
In order to further contrast this result, I use an alternative (multidimensional) mea-
sure of poverty, concretely the Unmet Basic Needs (UBN) index (Anand and Sen, 1994).
For this, I divided the UBN index into three quantiles and assign the lowest category the
poor status (=1), and zero otherwise. Table 3.12 shows the heterogeneous effects results
using the UBN indicator of poverty. While the results using the UBN criteria and the
transfer share are statistically non-significant, the interaction of the expenditure share
28The model does not include the single dummy poor, because information regarding poverty status is
only available for the base year (2001).
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Table 3.11: FE OLS results, by monetary poverty status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Water Toilet Underweight Stunting Underweight Stunting
Expenditure in sanitation 0.009 0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
Poor=1 · Expenditure in sanitation −0.005 −0.006
(0.007) (0.007)
Transfers share(log) −0.030*** −0.080***
(0.009) (0.017)
Poor=1 · Transfers share(log) −0.000 0.060***
(0.010) (0.016)
Expenditures share(log) −0.017 −0.061***
(0.011) (0.016)
Poor=1 · Expenditures share(log) 0.004 0.051***
(0.011) (0.018)
Rural −0.294***−0.046 0.012 0.040 0.003 0.030
(0.075) (0.058) (0.020) (0.048) (0.025) (0.060)
Indigenous proxy 0.257* 0.137 0.024 0.103 −0.024 −0.036
(0.153) (0.133) (0.072) (0.121) (0.093) (0.139)
Illiteracy −0.534***−0.206* 0.110 0.715*** 0.105 0.687***
(0.134) (0.121) (0.077) (0.116) (0.090) (0.131)
Household size −0.010 −0.034 0.009 0.088*** 0.006 0.093***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.017)
Population(log) −0.171***−0.019 0.024 0.012 0.016 −0.017
(0.048) (0.038) (0.016) (0.032) (0.017) (0.031)
Regional GDP(log) 0.185*** 0.092** −0.023 0.068* −0.008 0.065*
(0.055) (0.039) (0.032) (0.040) (0.028) (0.036)
Year 2012 dummy −0.032 −0.006 0.023 0.055 −0.001 0.037
(0.050) (0.041) (0.019) (0.036) (0.019) (0.038)
Observations 480 480 628 628 530 530
R2 0.64 0.46 0.21 0.58 0.19 0.57
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the
province level. Variables described in Table 3.4
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Figure 3.7: Marginal effects of an increase in fiscal decentralization, by monetary
poverty status
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and the “UBN” poor dummy is positive (column 6), confirming the previous result and
strengthening the fact that increased fiscal decentralization has not been pro-poor.
Table 3.12: FE OLS results, by UBN poverty status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Water Toilet Underweight Stunting Underweight Stunting
Expenditure in sanitation 0.005 0.006
(0.006) (0.005)
Poor by UBN=1 · Expenditure in sanitation 0.000 −0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
Transfers share(log) −0.013* −0.050**
(0.008) (0.020)
Poor by UBN=1 · Transfers share(log) −0.021*** −0.009
(0.006) (0.016)
Expenditures share(log) −0.008 −0.048**
(0.012) (0.022)
Poor by UBN=1 · Expenditures share(log) −0.008 0.033*
(0.010) (0.018)
Rural −0.293***−0.039 0.024 0.056 0.006 0.025
(0.076) (0.060) (0.020) (0.047) (0.025) (0.060)
Indigenous proxy 0.258* 0.135 0.011 −0.057 −0.035 −0.131
(0.153) (0.133) (0.066) (0.112) (0.090) (0.132)
Illiteracy −0.535***−0.216* 0.069 0.632*** 0.094 0.691***
(0.132) (0.122) (0.080) (0.132) (0.090) (0.140)
Household size −0.009 −0.032 0.010 0.088*** 0.007 0.095***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.017)
Population(log) −0.171***−0.019 0.029* −0.010 0.015 −0.041
(0.048) (0.037) (0.016) (0.034) (0.018) (0.032)
Regional GDP(log) 0.185*** 0.093** −0.030 0.054 −0.010 0.066*
(0.055) (0.040) (0.032) (0.043) (0.028) (0.038)
Year 2012 dummy −0.033 −0.007 0.018 0.054 −0.002 0.036
(0.050) (0.041) (0.019) (0.039) (0.019) (0.040)
Observations 480 480 628 628 530 530
R2 0.64 0.46 0.23 0.56 0.20 0.56
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the
province level. Variables described in Table 3.4
3.7.4 Robustness checks
3.7.4.1 Different samples
To confirm that the results from estimation of equation 1 are not driven by sample
selection, a number of robustness checks were developed, excluding certain municipalities
by some type of criteria. As a first exercise, those municipalities which are capitals of a
department plus El Alto city were excluded. These municipalities are mostly urbanized
and could have had better possibilities to increase access to basic services, as water and
sanitation, and better health conditions (e.g., better hospitals in the cities) to avoid
underweight or stunting. Table 3.13 present the results of the model without interactions
(Equation 3.1) using a sample excluding El Alto city and the capitals of each of the nine
departments.
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Table 3.13: FE OLS results, excluding capitals of department and El Alto city
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Water Toilet Underweight Stunting Underweight Stunting
Expenditure share in sanitation 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Transfers share(log) −0.032*** −0.061***
(0.008) (0.016)
Expenditures share(log) −0.014* −0.022
(0.008) (0.016)
Rural −0.284***−0.044 0.011 0.052 0.002 0.038
(0.078) (0.063) (0.020) (0.048) (0.025) (0.062)
Indigenous proxy 0.273* 0.157 0.023 −0.049 −0.035 −0.133
(0.154) (0.134) (0.068) (0.114) (0.092) (0.136)
Illiteracy −0.496***−0.193 0.098 0.655*** 0.094 0.688***
(0.147) (0.125) (0.080) (0.126) (0.094) (0.149)
Household size −0.005 −0.033 0.008 0.088*** 0.006 0.099***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.017)
Population(log) −0.175***−0.019 0.025 −0.012 0.014 −0.040
(0.050) (0.041) (0.015) (0.034) (0.018) (0.034)
Regional GDP(log) 0.205*** 0.104** −0.028 0.056 −0.011 0.059
(0.056) (0.041) (0.036) (0.045) (0.031) (0.039)
Year 2012 dummy −0.031 −0.010 0.024 0.062 −0.003 0.043
(0.052) (0.042) (0.021) (0.040) (0.020) (0.045)
Observations 461 461 608 608 510 510
R2 0.65 0.46 0.22 0.57 0.20 0.56
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the
province level. Variables described in Table 3.4
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The results from the estimation of the models using the sample without capital cities
are qualitatively the same as the full-sample model: increased fiscal decentralization
has not increased the access of municipalities to safe water nor sanitation. Similarly,
increased flow of resources to municipalities reduces the probability of being underweight
and stunted, and although the effect is statistically significant, their economic significance
is limited. The range of the estimated impact is -2.9 percentage points in the proportion
of underweight children and -5.6 percentage points in the proportion of stunted children
(using a median increase of 93% in the transfer share).
On the other hand, Table 3.14 show the results of the estimation using a sample
excluding the warmest municipalities (using average temperature information for year
2001). The sample was divided according to their average temperature in three quantiles
and assigned the value of one to the lowest quantile (cold=1). The reasoning behind this
choice is that coldest municipalities are in general high-altitude plateaus, in which agri-
culture is very difficult to develop, and are in general poorer and marginalized areas. The
exclusion of warmer municipalities would assure that the effects of increased decentral-
ization are not driven by more favorable weather conditions in these municipalities. As
Table 3.14 shows, the results qualitatively similar to those estimated for the full sample,
even considering the drastic reduction in the sample size. In this sense, the results of the
estimations do not appear to be driven by potential outliers.
Table 3.14: FE OLS results, excluding warmest municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Water Toilet Underweight Stunting Underweight Stunting
Expenditure share in sanitation 0.004 −0.001
(0.006) (0.010)
Transfers share(log) −0.100*** −0.089*
(0.028) (0.045)
Expenditures share(log) −0.023* −0.052**
(0.012) (0.021)
Rural −0.415***−0.126 0.025 0.151* −0.022 0.154
(0.118) (0.093) (0.040) (0.080) (0.036) (0.103)
Indigenous proxy −0.144 0.045 0.151 0.166 0.221 0.091
(0.256) (0.198) (0.117) (0.168) (0.140) (0.182)
Illiteracy −0.778*** 0.183 −0.011 0.414* −0.135 0.408
(0.192) (0.206) (0.196) (0.240) (0.231) (0.292)
Household size −0.004 −0.062 0.021 0.147*** 0.006 0.128***
(0.033) (0.047) (0.015) (0.028) (0.012) (0.029)
Population(log) −0.214** −0.044 0.038 −0.057 0.023 −0.049
(0.094) (0.063) (0.032) (0.050) (0.027) (0.051)
Regional GDP(log) 0.192* −0.074 −0.419*** −0.148 −0.215** −0.032
(0.106) (0.140) (0.112) (0.200) (0.105) (0.157)
Year 2012 dummy −0.107 0.089 0.254*** 0.252** 0.095* 0.159**
(0.075) (0.067) (0.068) (0.122) (0.050) (0.079)
Observations 157 157 210 210 189 189
R2 0.67 0.50 0.35 0.38 0.21 0.31
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the
province level. Variables described in Table 3.4
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Finally, Table 3.15 shows the results of estimation with a sample that excludes those
municipalities with oil and natural gas resources. By excluding those municipalities,
the effect of wealthier towns that could influence the positive results regarding service
delivery are ruled out. However, excluding these municipalities does not affect the results
of the estimations, and a (slight) reduction in the proportion of underweight and stunted
children is still observed.
Table 3.15: FE OLS results, excluding municipalities producers of oil and natural gas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Water Toilet Underweight Stunting Underweight Stunting
Expenditure share in sanitation 0.004 0.000
(0.004) (0.005)
Transfers share(log) −0.030*** −0.053***
(0.009) (0.015)
Expenditures share(log) −0.014* −0.022
(0.008) (0.017)
Rural −0.220***−0.011 0.014 0.074 0.001 0.077
(0.076) (0.064) (0.021) (0.050) (0.028) (0.066)
Indigenous proxy 0.198 0.103 0.029 −0.134 −0.012 −0.225*
(0.158) (0.134) (0.073) (0.119) (0.091) (0.127)
Illiteracy −0.450***−0.152 0.062 0.594*** 0.067 0.628***
(0.120) (0.113) (0.079) (0.134) (0.089) (0.148)
Household size 0.030 −0.025 0.005 0.081*** 0.005 0.096***
(0.019) (0.026) (0.009) (0.019) (0.010) (0.018)
Population(log) −0.212***−0.020 0.027* −0.015 0.010 −0.045
(0.048) (0.041) (0.016) (0.036) (0.019) (0.035)
Regional GDP(log) 0.143 0.007 −0.070 0.040 −0.043 0.053
(0.091) (0.049) (0.055) (0.063) (0.046) (0.052)
Year 2012 dummy 0.021 0.044 0.036 0.046 0.009 0.027
(0.051) (0.036) (0.028) (0.043) (0.024) (0.043)
Observations 409 409 540 540 458 458
R2 0.64 0.47 0.20 0.55 0.18 0.55
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the
province level. Variables described in Table 3.4
3.7.4.2 Instrumented regression
The relationship between decentralization and the access to sanitation, safe water and
nutrition could be endogenous for different reasons. Including municipality and year
fixed-effects help to alleviate the potential non-observable heterogeneity. In addition,
the relationship between fiscal transfers and service delivery could be subject to reverse-
causality. For example, a town with better living conditions could attract more popu-
lation, increasing the transfers from the central government. To overcome the potential
reverse causality bias, a 2SLS estimation method is used, based on a composite instrument
variable.
Some authors suggest the use of geographic characteristics to instrument decentral-
ization. It is argued that geographically diverse countries are more prone to decentralize
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because this feature is correlated with heterogeneous preferences (Canavire-Bacarreza
et al., 2016). However, while geographical variables could be claimed as truly exogenous,
panel data requires an instrument with variation over units and time. Then, a composite
instrument is used, comprising the interaction of the geographical variables with other
exogenous variable that exhibits variation over time29.
The instrumental variable is composed of certain geographic characteristics of mu-
nicipalities (area, altitude, distance to the sea and slope) multiplied by the international
price of the oil (WTI). The international price of oil is used because it is closely connected
to the finance of municipal governments (see Figure 3.3), considering the design of the
intergovernmental system of transfers and the country exporting profile. Indeed, Bolivia
as a country rich in natural gas, have increased greatly its fiscal revenues in the middle
of the 2000s decade, because of two main factors:
a) External factor : the value of natural gas exports is linked to the international price
of oil (WTI). Accordingly, an increase in WTI is positively associated with the
revenues for the central government (ρ = 0.91), and in turn, the central govern-
ment distributes this extra revenue to the municipalities through revenue sharing
arrangements as mandated by law, considering the number of inhabitants in each
municipality.
b) Internal factor : in 2005, the government changed the tax scheme for hydrocarbons,
requiring that the firms exploiting this natural resource now pay 50% of the value
of hydrocarbons, instead of 18% that was the proportion set before this change in
the law. This increase in the central government revenue implied a further increase
in the transfers from the center to the municipal governments.
In that sense, it is possible to use the international price of the oil as an exogenous
but closely related factor explaining the increase in the transfers from the center to the
regional governments and, at the same time, seemingly unrelated to the service delivery
and nourishment outcomes.
The exclusion restriction implies that WTI increase will affect the proposed outcomes
only through the transfer and expenditure share, and not directly or indirectly through
an omitted variable. The exclusion restriction would not hold if a boom in the natural
gas exports benefit directly to the population, improving their situation in terms of access
to water, sanitation, nutrition, and general living conditions. However, because the oil
and natural gas sector are capital-intensive, it does not imply a much greater demand for
jobs. In this sense, the direct benefit of an oil-based boom would be small30.
The geophysical characteristics of each municipality to interact with the WTI price
are: area, altitude, distance to the sea and slope. Considering the distribution of the four
composite instruments, Table 3.16 shows the 2SLS results using the log(Area ·WTI) as
instrument31.
29For applications, see Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016) and Esarey (2015).
30The proportion of workers in the oil sector with respect to the total number of workers is very low
(2% in 2001 and 3% in 2012), according to Census data.
31Area is measured in squared kilometers.
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Table 3.16: IV 2SLS model for access to safe water, toilet, underweight and stunting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Water Toilet Underweight Stunting Underweight Stunting
Expenditure in sanitation −0.131 −0.031
(0.418) (0.205)
Transfers share(log) 0.007 0.033
(0.029) (0.064)
Expenditures share(log) −0.021 0.125
(0.080) (0.219)
Rural −0.100 0.000 −0.017 −0.020 0.008 −0.063
(0.608) (0.278) (0.033) (0.070) (0.063) (0.174)
Indigenous proxy 0.146 0.112 −0.027 −0.179 −0.038 −0.020
(0.555) (0.254) (0.062) (0.120) (0.144) (0.288)
Illiteracy −1.078 −0.334 0.124 0.682*** 0.098 0.746**
(1.861) (0.906) (0.084) (0.148) (0.117) (0.298)
Household size −0.020 −0.036 0.016 0.104*** 0.005 0.126**
(0.063) (0.042) (0.012) (0.027) (0.021) (0.061)
Population(log) −0.045 0.011 −0.022 −0.124 0.022 −0.196
(0.430) (0.212) (0.044) (0.098) (0.092) (0.264)
Regional GDP(log) −0.011 0.047 −0.011 0.085** −0.009 0.069
(0.523) (0.263) (0.023) (0.043) (0.024) (0.052)
Observations 360 360 628 628 432 432
R2 -1.29 0.27 0.16 0.51 0.19 0.33
First stage F-stat 0.14 0.14 15.74 15.74 1.23 1.23
p-value for endogeneity test 0.51 0.85 0.21 0.14 0.93 0.39
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the
province level. Variables described in Table 3.4
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The results from the first stage show that the composite instrument is adequate (F-
statistic more than 10) only when nourishment indicators are used as dependent variables
(Columns 3 and 4). However, the 2SLS results yield statistically non-significant estimates
for all decentralization proxies. In this sense, a Hausman-Wu test was performed, in order
to compare the estimates from OLS model and 2SLS under the null hypothesis that
OLS would yield consistent estimates. In all cases (regarding the dependent variables),
the results of the test fail to reject the null hypothesis to the 10% confidence level.
Thus, endogeneity caused by reverse causality bias would not necessarily impose a serious
challenge to the previous OLS-FE estimates.
Indeed, as transfers from the central government are driven by population, a mi-
gratory movement would need to be massive in order to change the transfer patterns.
According to 2012 census data, the internal migratory movements have been modest,
with only an average of 7% of people that lived in other part of the country before. In
that sense, it is unlikely that internal migratory movements influenced in greater extent
the transfers from the central government to the local governments.
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3.8 Conclusions
Increase in fiscal decentralization in Bolivia during the 2000s decade seems to have im-
proved citizen’s welfare only limitedly. Indeed, access to water or to sanitation at the
municipal level did not see improvement, while the increased fiscal decentralization ap-
parently helped to reduce the proportion of underweight and stunted (less than 5 years
old) children at the municipal level. However, the magnitude of this effect was small in
view of the huge increases in municipal revenues and expenditures in the ten-year span
of the data.
The interaction effect between fiscal decentralization and the political and admin-
istrative dimensions of the decentralization process seems to be relevant in this setting.
Specifically, a greater share of public servants in the municipal governments seems to
reinforce the effect of fiscal decentralization on the reduction of stunted children. On
the other hand, political support also appears as a key factor in order to reinforce the
effect of increased transfers from the central government to the municipalities. Indeed,
as the winning share was greater in local elections, the increase in fiscal decentralization
appeared to be more effective in reducing the proportion of stunted children at the mu-
nicipal level. These results confirm that the different dimensions of the decentralization
process are dependent among them, so a reform entailing only one component could fall
short in terms of the delivery of local public goods and impact on citizens’ welfare.
Regarding heterogeneous effects distinguishing by poverty status, results show that
increased fiscal decentralization has contributed to reduce the proportion of underweight
and stunted children, but interestingly the effect seems to be stronger in non-poor mu-
nicipalities, as compared to the poor ones. This result of “non-pro-poorness” proves to
be robust to the threshold choice for considering a municipality as poor, as well as to
the poverty indicator (e.g. UBN versus monetary poverty). This also shows that the
potential benefits of decentralization could be better exploited by the non-poor, given
their favorable initial conditions in comparison with the poor ones (see among others
Galiani et al., 2008 and Soto et al., 2012.).
Overall, the results suggest that despite the remarkable change of responsibilities
and the increase in economic resources transferred to local governments in Bolivia during
the 2000s decade, the impact of fiscal decentralization has been limited. Future research
should focus on developing further measures that capture in a more accurate dimension
the change in the responsibilities of local or regional governments in specific sectors as
water and sanitation, but in a broad sense as well. In addition, variables capturing the
administrative and political dimensions of decentralization would be worth to explore.
Such measures would give a better sense of the effectiveness of decentralization’s impact
on welfare and service delivery.
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CHAPTER
FOUR
ADDRESSING HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY IN BOLIVIA:
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF FISCAL POLICY?
4.1 Introduction
The Latin American region has historically been one of the most unequal regions of the
world. Gon˜i et al. (2011) states that inequality indicators (in particular the Gini coeffi-
cient) in the region are among the highest in the world, only after Sub-Saharan Africa,
the most unequal region of the planet. Although in the last 20 years the Gini coefficient
(which reflects the disparity between the top and the bottom of the income distribu-
tion) has drastically reduced (Lopez-Calva and Lustig, 2010), the region continues to
have persistent inequality in various dimensions, including income, expenditures, wealth,
education and health32.
This chapter aims to shed light on the potential role of the fiscal policy (taxes and
transfers) on the group inequality in Bolivia. By group (or horizontal) inequality, I refer to
the difference in income (or other welfare indicator) as a consequence of the membership
to a specified group (determined, e.g., by race, gender, location, etc.). The interest on
this type of inequality lies on the potential exclusion of certain groups (e.g., indigenous
or women) from individual economic and social progress, still present in certain societies.
This exclusion could be rooted on colonial grounds and persisting over time (Acemoglu
et al., 2001). Gender exclusion in turn is mostly based on the burden that some societies
impose to women, regarding their role as family and child carers, thus limiting their
access to education (Lewis and Lockheed, 2007).
The reduction of inequality is important for several reasons: from a moral point
of view, we would aim to a more equal and fair society (especially regarding the so-
called equality of opportunities (Roemer and Trannoy, 2014). In addition, some authors
argue that more equal societies have stronger economic growth (Cingano, 2014), are
happier (Graham and Pettinato, 2002), and because reducing inequality is a broader goal
in comparison to reducing poverty. Inequality creates a society in conflict (Lindquist,
32While income distribution is used as the most widely-used source of inequality, the Gini coefficient
could be also calculated using other non-income dimensions, e.g. years of education.
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2011), which successively could harm long-term institutions, affecting development, and
generating a vicious circle of poverty (Collier, 2008).
The downward trend in inequality mentioned above has been also observed in Bolivia
in the last decades. For example, Eid and Aguirre (2013) finds that inequality in Bolivia
fell 13 points (from Gini coefficient 0.59 to 0.46) between 1999 and 2011, outperforming
any other country in Latin America in terms of inequality reduction. Some authors argue
that the reduction of inequality is the result of redistribution policies (noticeably the
increase in the minimum wage, see Canavire Bacarreza and Rios-Avila, 2015). Another
view is that the reduction is a consequence of the boom in commodities’ prices in the
2000s, which at the same time allowed the government to expand its social policy, for
example through cash transfers. Vargas and Garriga (2015) state that the reduction in
inequality was driven mainly by labor income, while non-labor income (e.g., transfers,
remittances) played a minor role.
Despite of the fact that Bolivia is the country with the largest proportion of people
that are self-identified or considered as indigenous in Latin America (Lustig, 2017), the
horizontal dimension of inequality has been neglected in the research about drivers and
determinants of income inequality reduction. For that reason, the question about the
ability of public policy to reduce group inequality is still unexplored and important to
address.
The chapter is structured in the following way: the next section reviews the relevant
literature with respect to inequality in general, and to horizontal inequality in particular.
Afterwards, I discuss the data and empirical strategy, for later present the results of the
tax-benefit incidence model regarding group-inequality indicators. Then, some robustness
checks and sensitivity analysis are explained, and final part exposes conclusions and
potential policy recommendations.
4.2 Review of the literature
The evidence about the harming consequences of social segmentation on societies is well
recognized. Easterly and Levine (1997) mentions ethnic fractionalization as the main
factor behind poor public policies in a set of countries in Africa. At the same time, the
existence of ethnic cleavages are correlated with low schooling, underdeveloped financial
system and political instability, all of these factors leading to a poor economic growth
outlook. Alesina et al. (2003) supports the hypothesis that ethnic and linguistic fraction-
alization are correlated with economic success or failure, although the authors state that
it is difficult to claim causality because of endogeneity and measurement issues. Lack of
social cohesion and potential conflict among indigenous and non-indigenous groups (due
to extremely unequal access to economic resources and opportunities) are the factors that
would explain the relationship between a highly fractionalized society and poor economic
and social outcomes.
As in some African countries, ethnic fractionalization is also observed in Latin Amer-
ica, where indigenous population have been excluded from education opportunities, ad-
equate health services, and access to formal jobs. For example, Psacharopoulos and
Patrinos (1994) finds consistently an income gap between indigenous and non-indigenous
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population in five countries of Latin America (Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico,
and Peru). Indigenous population often have less access to basic services as sanitation,
safe water, and electricity than non-indigenous population, even considering locational
differences, and have a greater probability of being poor (Trivelli, 2005).
While the the ethnic nature of fractionalization mentioned by these authors is promi-
nent, other researchers have recognized the relevance of inter-group inequality using an-
other criteria, like gender and location. Regarding location, if current global inequality
is decomposed, the most important factor behind it is location (between-country) in-
equality, as compared to intra-country inequality. (Milanovic, 2012, p. 128). Despite this
observation applies when cross-country comparisons are used, the same statement could
apply within a given country, due to the acute differences between cities and the rural
area (especially in developing countries). For example, Sicular et al. (2007) finds that
the mean urban income in China is almost three-times the average income in the rural
area. This pattern is also observed in other emerging countries (for India, see Sarkar and
Mehta, 2010; for other BRIC countries, see Cevik and Correa-Caro, 2015). The case of
gender inequality is also well documented in the literature and although the gender gap
in terms of education years have reduced noticeably in Latin America in the recent years
(Rodriguez-Castelan et al., 2016), women are systematically among the most vulnerable
groups (N˜opo, 2012). In this sense, income inequality between men and women equally
qualified persists, and this is an area in which more progress could be achieved (Schwab
et al., 2017).
The role of fiscal policy and its impact on (vertical) inequality has been approached
extensively. For example, Joumard et al. (2013) states that the effect of taxes on in-
equality varies according to the characteristics of each country, with respect to its welfare
system, and the importance of indirect as opposed to direct taxes and the level of infor-
mality. Coady and Gupta (2012) affirms that the capacity of redistribution of the state is
much more limited in a developing country as compared to a developed one because the
taxes and transfers are considerably lower in the former than in the latter. In the specific
case of Bolivia, Paz Arauco et al. (2014) affirm that distributional policies in Bolivia have
been ineffective. This could be due to the lack of targeting of cash transfers, leading to
leakages. Limitations in the amount of social transfers, and the (mostly regressive) tax
system also plays a role. The authors find that the combination of tax and transfers
actually end up harming the neediest (those in the bottom of the income distribution).
This research focuses on vertical inequality measures (in specific, the Gini coefficient) to
assess the distributional impact of fiscal policy.
There are a few studies that tackle the topic of horizontal inequality and fiscal in-
terventions. Cabrera et al. (2015) find that fiscal interventions in Guatemala had very
little effect over the reduction of poverty and inequality, most probably due to a mal-
functioning tax system. On the other hand, Lustig (2017) examines the role of fiscal
transfers and taxes on inequality indicators in Bolivia, Brazil and Guatemala. She finds
that the fiscal systems in these countries reduce the income gap between the indigenous
and non-indigenous, but this reduction is very limited. She attributes the limited effect
of these policies to the small size of the transfers.
While the aforementioned authors already address the impact of fiscal interventions
on inequality among ethnic groups, they rely on entropy indicators to measure the dis-
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tinct components of inequality (within- and between- inequality). Thus, the horizontal
inequality is measured using a specific indicator (the Theil index). This indicator could
be decomposed in the between- and within-inequality components, with respect to the
analyzed groups (Haughton and Khandker, 2009). The dimensions of inequality are often
presented intuitively as proportions of total inequality. A potential problem with the use
of this indicator, is that it depends of its contribution to a measure of “total inequality”
(Stewart et al., 2005), and it is not an independent measure of group inequality.33
A second issue in the literature regarding indigenous inequality is the tendency to
oversimplify the ethnic categorization, i.e. as a dummy variable. In principle this division
is useful to have a first sense of the effect of the fiscal system on the ethnic gap. However, a
white vs. non-white classification seems simplistic and could trigger biases in the analysis.
In this sense, in this chapter I propose the construction of an ethnicity index, which takes
into account various factors that better capture the degree of the ethnic condition of a
household. The index is composed of three elements: self-identification, language, and
location, each of these elements contributing to the “degree” of ethnicity.
Finally, the literature has increasingly addressed the important topic of “intersec-
tionalities”, a term coined to account for overlapping characteristics that could lead to
increased inequalities (Crenshaw, 1991). Hence, it is not only the ethnic condition that
could determine the exclusion of certain population groups, but the combination of two
or more characteristics. Being, for example, indigenous and woman could determine a
much more acute problem regarding discrimination of historically disadvantaged groups
(Lenhardt and Samman, 2015).
4.3 Data and empirical strategy
4.3.1 Data
The data for the tax-benefit incidence model comes primarily from the 2015 Bolivian
Household Survey (Encuesta a Hogares - EH 2015), carried out by the National Institute
of Statistics. The household follows the format of the World Bank’s Living Standards
Measurement Study (LSMS) survey program, and incorporates a variety of personal and
household information, related to demographic characteristics, household types, migra-
tion, health, education, labor, income and expenditures. The sample comprises 37,364
individuals grouped in 10,171 households. The data was collected between November
and December of 2015. The household survey is representative at the national level, with
an urban/rural distinction. The sampling process considered stratification at a primary
sampling unit (PSU), with the use of expansion factors. These expansion factors allow
to obtain the figures corresponding to the national level, from the collected sample.
Table 4.1 shows the demographic characteristics referred to the analyzed group cat-
egories. The table shows information regarding the counts and the proportions over
33For example, suppose that the calculation of the Theil index results in the following proportions: 25%
of the inequality is due to between-group inequality and 75% is due to within-inequality. Now suppose
that both components double and so the total inequality: the proportions will still be 25% between and
75% within, but the horizontal inequality will be in fact more severe than before the increase. Thus, the
Theil indicator fails in signaling the worsening of group-inequality in this made-up case.
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total population in the three categories: indigenous, gender and location (urban/rural).
Regarding indigenous categories, the table includes information with respect to the self-
identification status. In this sense, it reports the counting and proportion of those people
that declared to pertain to one of the 37 indigenous groups formally recognized by Law34.
Later in the chapter some alternatives will be explored regarding the classification of
indigenous/non-indigenous using another criteria.
Table 4.1: Indigenous, gender and
location proportions
Category Proportion
Non-indigenous 0.727 (0.0102)
Indigenous 0.273 (0.0102)
Male 0.495 (0.00238)
Female 0.505 (0.00238)
Urban 0.686 (0.00901)
Rural 0.314 (0.00901)
Standard errors between parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on EH 2015.
The table shows that the self-declared indigenous proportion reach approximately
27% of total population, which is smaller in comparison with the 2012 Census’ figure
(41.7%). As this is based on self-declaration, this change could be driven by a lower
effervescence for pertaining to an indigenous category, especially after the 2009 procla-
mation of a “new Plurinational state”35. With respect to the other grouping categories,
the proportions show an even distribution between men and women, and that less than
one third of the population lives in rural areas. In comparison with the proportion ob-
served in 2012 (32.5%, according to the Census), this implies an increasing tendency for
urbanization.
4.3.2 Empirical strategy
In order to estimate the impact of net transfer on horizontal inequality, I use a standard
tax-benefit incidence analysis model (Demery, 2003). This methodology consists in the
identification and quantification of components of the individual income, starting from
labor income, capital transfers, remittances, and other private transfers. Subsequently,
the model incorporates other sources of additional revenues (like subsidies and cash or
in-kind transfers) and taxes to reach to the final income that an individual possesses after
taking into account all the components of the income flow.
34Despite the large number of indigenous groups, in Bolivia there are two principal indigenous groups:
the aymara and the quechua, which according to the last census (2012) accounted for 82% of the total
indigenous population(self-declared).
35In 2009, a new Constitution was approved changing the name from “Republic of Bolivia” to “Pluri-
national State of Bolivia”. This change supposedly reflected the multi-cultural character of the country,
including its more than 30 ethnic groups, although many of them almost without relevant representation
(Uprimny, 2011).
70
The components of the income flow are depicted in Figure 4.1, illustrating the differ-
ent income concepts, and the sequential incorporation of taxes, transfers, and subsidies, to
reach to the final income, which incorporates all public interventions. This standardized
methodology has been applied in some countries/case studies to assess the role of public
transfers/taxes in reducing inequality measured through a standard indicator (Gini, Theil
or Atkinson measures) (Lustig and Pereira, 2016).
Figure 4.1: Income concepts
Market Income
Net market Income
Disposable Income
Post-
Final Income
Direct taxes 
Indirect taxes
Co-payments, fees
Direct transfers
Indirect subsidies
In-kind transfers
Transfers (+) Taxes (+)
fiscal income
Source: Lustig and Higgins (2013).
All the income concepts, as well as the taxes and transfers, are measured in local
currency (Bolivianos - Bs.36). The first component in Figure 4.1, the market income, is
composed of labor income (both coming from dependent and independent activities), as
well as capital income and private transfers (including remittances and social security
36At the end of 2015, the exchange rate Bs./USD was around Bs.7 per USD. This exchange rate is
fixed de facto.
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payments). As transfers are added and taxes are reduced from the disposable income,
the market income turn into a final income, which includes all the deductions and cash
and in-kind transfers the individual is entitled to. The same scope have been followed by
Paz Arauco et al. (2014), Lustig and Pereira (2016) and Lustig et al. (2014), using the
guidelines established in Lustig and Higgins (2013). The research strategy then consists
in comparing the group-inequality indicators with and without government intervention
(i.e., using the market income and the final income). All the components in between of
those income concepts will be defined with detail later in subsection 4.3.3.
The framework expressed in mathematical terms is the following:
yh = Ih −
∑
i
TiSih (4.1)
Where Ih is the income before taxes and transfers; Ti are net taxes of type i and Sih
is the share of net tax i borne by unit h.
Given that the interest of the analysis lies on the indigenous, gender and urban/rural
condition, the unit of assessment is the individual. Since the household is subject to
a variety of transfers, this entails adding the income and transfers received by all the
members of the family and then divide this whole amount by the number of household
members. In this way, we come up with an estimate of each of the income components
as shown in Figure 4.1.
One important matter is how the indigenous status of a person is defined. There
are various potential indicators for indigenous status, but they can be controversial and
difficult to identify. Martinez Cobo (1984) mentions for example the occupation of an-
cestral lands, common ancestry in these territories, culture (or specific manifestations of
it, as religion, dress, etc.), and language as factors that define the indigenous status of
a person. Regarding language, this criteria tends to be less subjective than the others
(Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 2009), and in addition could be easily identified
using the household survey information. Other authors have also utilized the language
criteria to define indigenous status (in the case of Latin America see Urrea-Giraldo and
Rodr´ıguez-Sa´nchez, 2014; for Asia see van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001).
Thus, the criterion used to define the ethnicity will be twofold. The first benchmark
will rely in the self-identification indigenous status of the individual, provided by a spe-
cific question in the questionnaire. The remaining criteria relies on an ethno-linguistic
definition of the indigenous status: the person will be considered as indigenous if he/she
speaks a native tongue in the first place (before Spanish), or if he/she has learned to talk
in a native tongue, or if he/she speaks any native tongue. The other grouping variables
(gender and urban/rural location) are explicitly defined in the survey data.
Measures of horizontal inequality
Traditional measures of (vertical) inequality include the Gini coefficient, the so-called
entropy measures (Theil L and Theil T), as well as the Atkinson inequality measure
(Haughton and Khandker, 2009). While the Gini coefficient cannot be decomposed into
between and within-group inequality components, the entropy measures (Theil family)
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can be decomposed in order to explore to which extent each dimension adds to total
inequality.
To assess the impact of fiscal policy, one approach would be to calculate Theil L and
Theil T indicators for the income distribution of each of the income concepts depicted
in Figure 4.1, and then assess the change in inequality in both dimensions (within and
between inequality) and how much represent each of them in total inequality. However,
some authors argue that it is more adequate to have an independent measure of horizontal
inequality, rather than using one that depends on its contribution to total (vertical)
inequality (Stewart et al., 2005; Stewart et al., 2009; Stewart, 2011). Indeed, Stewart
et al. (2005) propose the following indicators to measure the horizontal inequality over
defined groupings (native status, gender or location):
1. Group coefficient of variation (GCOV):
1
y¯
(
R∑
r
pr(y¯r − y¯)2
) 1
2
2. Group Gini (GGINI):
1
2y¯
R∑
r
S∑
s
prps|y¯r − y¯s|
3. Group Theil (GTHEIL):
R∑
r
pr
y¯r
y¯
log
(
y¯r
y¯
)
Where y¯r is the group r mean income (pre and post-transfer/taxes), pr is group r
population share, and y¯ is the mean income. In the notation, r can be characterized as
indigenous, female or rural status, for each computed horizontal inequality indicator.
In this sense, the strategy involves the calculation of the mentioned group-inequality
indicators in each of the income stages, to evaluate if the net transfers helped to reduce the
ethnic, gender and locational income gap. Ideally, the role of the state would aim to level-
up the income of the groups in most need. Historically, native, female and people living in
rural areas were excluded from formal labor markets, adequate education and health, and
so for that reason they could have less income. In an ideal setting, these characteristics
(native status, gender and location) should not determine people’s potential revenue
(the so-called “equality of opportunities” approach (Roemer, 2009;Roemer and Trannoy,
2014).
4.3.3 Construction of the tax-benefit incidence model
Some assumptions must be made in order to build the tax-benefit incidence model. The
first assumption is that we consider the income per capita: all the sources of (net and
gross) income are aggregated and divided between the number of family members. The
inequality indicators are then calculated using this per capita income. The second as-
sumption is that the membership to each grouping category (native status, female, and
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rural) is modeled using an indicator function, that takes the value of one if the individual
belongs to each category, and zero otherwise. This assumption is relaxed later, when I
calculate an indigenousness index (ranging from zero to one) that incorporates potential
features of native status.
Market income
The first income component as showed in Figure 4.1 is the market income. This com-
ponent was calculated by aggregating the labor income (considering dependent or inde-
pendent activities), in-kind transfers related to the labor relationship, capital income, as
well as all the private transfers (that is, all the transfers received by the individual that
are not given by the government)37.
In order to detect outliers, the calculated labor income was contrasted with the
declared labor income incorporated as an original variable in the survey. In that sense,
the bacon algorithm was applied (Weber, 2010) to the proportion of declared income
between calculated income, to exclude those observations that lie above certain tolerance
level (0.025). Using this level, a total of 1,589 (out of 12,298) observations were flagged
as outliers and excluded from the analysis38.
It is important to clarify the role of direct taxes in the Bolivian fiscal system. The
closest tax to a personal income tax (PIT) is the complementary-VAT tax (RC-IVA). It
consists in taxing personal income above a certain level (those who received more than
Bs.9,164 per month in 2015 -around USD1,310-). However, these individuals are allowed
to “discharge” the due amount by presenting their consumption bills up to certain sum
to overcome this payment39. In this sense, the RC-IVA is a poor substitute of a PIT
scheme and the tax revenue attached to it is low with respect to the whole tax revenue
in Bolivia (representing around 0.8% of total tax revenue in 2015). In addition, as the
household survey does not identify this tax, it cannot be incorporated in the analysis.
Disposable income
Disposable income calculation implies the first intervention of the government in the flow
showed in Figure 4.1. This income concept is calculated by adding the direct transfers
provided by the government to the beneficiaries. The direct transfers are basically coming
from the three main cash transfers program active in the country: the “Bono Juana Azur-
duy” program, the “Renta Dignidad” universal pension scheme, and the “Bono Juancito
Pinto” program.
The “Bono Juana Azurduy” is a conditional cash transfer program, and the benefi-
ciaries of the transfer are pregnant women and children up to two years old, conditional
on the regular attendance to medical check-ups (Vidal et al., 2015). The payments in
cash given by the program are detailed in Table 4.2:
37The private transfers are: transfers from other persons in the country, remittances, compensation
(e.g. redundancy payment) and non-labor earned transfers (private pension schemes).
38The proportion of excluded observations is 11.44%.
39For example, a person that in 2017 earns Bs12,000 (roughly USD 1710) monthly, would have to pay
Bs321 in PIT concept. However, if this person presents bills for Bs2474, he/she can avoid the payment
of this tax.
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Table 4.2: Payments for the “Bono Juana Azurduy”
Item Max. # of payments Amount(Bs.) Total(Bs.)
Pre-natal care 4 50 200
Payment on delivery 1 120 120
Post-delivery check-ups 12 125 1,500
TOTAL 1,820
Source: Own elaboration based on Vidal et al. (2015).
Given the information on Table 4.2, theoretically the maximum amount that a house-
hold could receive (per child and per year) is Bs.1,820 (approximately USD 260). In
addition to this cash payments, the program also covers the delivery of the children in
public hospitals, which will be included in the health-in kind transfers’ component.
With respect to the “Renta Dignidad” program, it consists in a non-contributory
pension scheme, provided to all citizens older than 60 years old (Escobar et al., 2013).
The monthly amount provided in 2015 was either Bs.200 (USD 28) or Bs.250 (USD
35) depending if the recipient entitled to receive the benefit was receiving other pension
benefit or not. The monthly amount is aggregated to get a yearly payment per person
and household.
Finally, the “Bono Juancito Pinto” is a conditional cash transfer, consisting in the
payment of Bs.200 (USD 28) annually to school students (both primary and secondary
school) that are enrolled in public schools (run by the government) (Marco, 2012). The
payment is conditional on the assistance to more than 80% of the school days during the
last academic year (running from February to November).
Post-fiscal income
The next component in the estimation of the final income is the incorporation of indirect
subsidies and indirect taxes in the household income. With respect to the indirect sub-
sidies, the household survey allows to identify the subsidies to gasoline and propane gas
(used for cooking). Together, they represent the main component of subsidies that can
be identified using the household surveys40.
With respect to the price of gasoline, it is fixed at a rate of USD 0.70 per liter,
while the international price is the double (based on information in Agencia Nacional
de Hidrocarburos, 2015). In that respect, the assumption I made is that the households
would have spent twice as much on gasoline without the subsidy. This excludes a potential
behavioral reaction to the subsidy’s elimination, but as the microsimulation model is a
non-behavioral model, this is an assumption that is needed to be made. The subsidy
component is only activated if the household possess a vehicle and/or a motorcycle.
In the other hand, the price of propane gas paid by the families is around USD 3 per
container. The international price of propane is set by the Mont Belvieu TX Propane
40Subsidies to hydrocarbons represented 2.5% of the total government expenditures in 2015 (Ministerio
de Economia y Finanzas Publicas, 2015).
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spot price41. In 2015, this price was around the double than of the domestic price of
propane, so I assume that the expenditure in cooking gas of the families would have been
twice as much as declared, provided there was no subsidy given. This again rules out any
behavioral consequence of the elimination of subsidies.
At this stage of the calculation, I incorporate the indirect taxes component of the tax-
benefit incidence model. While the household survey does not identify the indirect taxes
paid by the individuals, I use the indirect taxes incidence estimated by Cossio (2001)42.
The author calculates the impact of indirect taxes by distinguishing their impact with
respect to different income quintiles. As expected, indirect taxes are regressive because
poorest people pay a greater proportion of their income on those, as compared with richer
people. Besides, given that in the rural area people are not expected to buy goods from
formal businesses, it is likely that the incidence of these taxes is lesser as opposed to
urban areas. In that sense, I assume that the structure of the indirect tax incidence in
the rural area is one third of the incidence in the urban area43. The incidence rates are
shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Estimated incidence of indirect taxes
Quintile Urban incidence Rural incidence
1st (poorest) 25.0 8.3
2nd 18.0 5.9
3rd 19.0 6.3
4th 17.0 5.6
5th (richest) 15.0 4.9
Source: Own elaboration based on Cossio (2001).
Final income
The last step involves the calculation of the final income, by incorporating the in-kind
transfers to the post-fiscal income44. This is the component of the calculation that requires
the most of assumptions, as it have elements of health care and education that are not
identified accurately by the survey’s questionnaire. The first element is the health care
component of the in-kind transfers. In the health module of the household survey, I
identify two interventions that don’t require payment for the users of health services: the
first one is the general health attention, which is assumed not to be incurred by the user
but by the public facility. The imputed in-kind health transfer is a fixed amount of USD
217 if the health facility is located in the urban area, and of USD 108 if the facility is
located in the rural area45. A caveat of this approach is that it cannot be determined
41Information available at https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_SPT_S1_D.htm.
42While this reference is long-standing, the fact that the indirect tax rates has not changed provides
support for relying on this source.
43The indirect taxes evaluated are: IVA (value-added tax), IT (a tax to transactions, is applied to the
transfer of services and goods), ICE (a sin tax), and IEHD (an hydrocarbons tax).
44The component referred to co-payments and fees are assumed to be zero.
45These imputed values come from information regarding the public budget assigned to health, divided
by the population (Paz Arauco et al., 2014).
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how many times the person recurred to the health services. In that sense, I assume that
the reported use of health facilities was done only once.
The second major health intervention is the delivery care. For women enrolled in the
“Bono Juana Azurduy” program, this cost is covered by the health facility center. Again,
I distinguish between rural and urban area regarding the cost of this service and impute
a value of USD 653 for deliveries in the urban area, while the cost for rural areas is USD
326 (half the cost in the urban area). These values come from the “Bono Juana Azurduy”
Program and represent the average cost for delivery attention in their respective areas.
The other major component in the in-kind transfers’ component of the income flow
is the one related to education. I assume that every family member that attends a public
education center (primary, secondary, or tertiary education) receive an in-kind transfer
provided by the government, by not having to pay fees for attending the education center.
The imputed values are the same used by Paz Arauco et al. (2014), and varies depending
on the level of education. For primary education, I assume a yearly cost of USD 317 for
children in primary school; USD 250 for children in secondary school; and USD 1,338 for
tertiary education. Again, these imputed values represent average costs, but in this case
no distinction is made between urban and rural areas.
Finally, a small component of the in-kind transfers identified by the household survey
is the “desayuno escolar”, a free breakfast provided by the government in public schools.
The transfer given by this program is assumed to be valued in around USD 28 per year
(Paz Arauco et al., 2014).
The summary statistics regarding the different income concepts as described in this
section are shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Summary statistics of income concepts
Mean SD CV
Market income 14,354 14,876 1.036
Disposable income 14,663 14,893 1.016
Post-fiscal income 12,594 13,025 1.034
Final income 13,913 12,954 0.931
Note: All figures in current Bs. SD=standard devia-
tion. CV=coefficient of variation
Source: Own elaboration based on EH 2015
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Overall and within-group inequality
As a first step, overall inequality indicators were estimated to compare them with well-
known sources. As the Gini coefficient is the most widely-used indicator for inequality, I
concentrate in this measure. Table 4.5 compares the Gini’s coefficient using the EH 2015
77
with other author’s calculations for the same period of time (where possible).46. As it
can be observed, the different estimations of Gini coefficients are very similar, providing
a robustness check and adding confidence to the process of data cleaning. The actual
figures can vary because of different methodologies, but the estimates lie among what is
widely acknowledged regarding the overall inequality in the country.
Table 4.5: Estimated Gini coefficients
Year Gini Reference
2013 44.15 Solt (2016)
2014 48.40 World Bank (2017)
2015 45.53 CEDLAS (2017)
2015 48.30 UNU WIDER (2015)
2015 46.31 Own calculation
As a next step, I calculate inequality indicators for each of the group categories
(indigenous, gender, and location), that is, within categories. This gives a better sense
of the income distribution inside each category, as a complement of the group inequality
indicators presented later in the chapter. Table 4.6 shows different inequality indicators
for each of the groups analyzed. As per the Gini coefficient and the percentile ratio, the
group with the most income inequality seems to be the rural, followed by the indigenous.
Regarding sensibilities to different parts of the distribution, the general entropy measures
(GE) indicate that the male group tends to be more unequal, especially in the top of the
distribution47.
Table 4.6: Within-group inequality indicators
Gini p90/p10 GE(0) GE(1) GE(2)
Non-indigenous 0.45 10.27 0.42 0.36 0.52
Indigenous 0.48 14.74 0.49 0.40 0.57
Male 0.47 11.96 0.46 0.51 0.91
Female 0.46 11.67 0.45 0.30 0.43
Urban 0.41 6.88 0.32 0.37 0.52
Rural 0.52 17.37 0.59 0.39 0.58
Source: Own calculations based on EH 2015
4.4.2 Decomposition of inequality
While the indicators showed in Table 4.6 point to the inequalities within each group,
a first approach towards the inequality between groups is needed. As stated before, a
46The income concept used for this calculation was the disposable income, because it is used for official
(reporting) reasons.
47General Entropy measures are useful to disentangle changes in different part of the distribution
(Jenkins, 1999).
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characteristic of the Theil inequality index is that it can be decomposed into within-
and between- inequality. In this sense, Table 4.7 shows the Theil index [GE(0), GE(1)
and GE(2)] for the different group categories, differentiating by its contribution to total
inequality.
Table 4.7: Between- and within-inequality decompositions
GE(0)
Indigenous Gender Location
Between 2.4% 0.1% 10.2%
Within 97.6% 99.9% 89.8%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
GE(1)
Indigenous Gender Location
Between 2.7% 0.2% 10.9%
Within 97.3% 99.8% 89.1%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
GE(2)
Indigenous Gender Location
Between 1.8% 0.1% 6.9%
Within 98.2% 99.9% 93.1%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Own calculations based on EH 2015
The results on inequality decomposition reveal that the component that explain most
of the overall inequality is the within-component, being the rural group the one that have
the greatest component of group-inequality (between 7% and 10%). However, as stated
previously, an independent measure of horizontal inequality would be more adequate
to assess the level and changes of between-groups inequality. In that sense, the group-
Gini coefficient was calculated in all the four stages as shown in Figure 4.1, using the
grouping criteria defined previously48. Table 4.8 present a summary of all the group-Gini
coefficients calculated for the grouping categories: indigenous (various specifications),
gender, and location (urban vs. rural).
Indigenous inequality
The different group Gini calculations for indigenous status are shown in Figure 4.2. As
this entails different measurement as stated previously (regarding the self-identification
and the ethno-linguistic component), the evolution of the GGini for each of the categories
is presented, alongside the distinct income stages.
48Because of its direct interpretation (same as regular Gini coefficient), the GGini is used in all the
remaining estimations. The results corresponding to the other group-inequality indicators (GCov and
GTheil) are presented in the appendix.
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Table 4.8: Group-Gini coefficients
Indigenous Gender Location
Self First Any Learned
Market income 0.066 0.089 0.086 0.093 0.019 0.135
Disposable income 0.061 0.083 0.080 0.086 0.018 0.129
Post-fiscal income 0.056 0.079 0.074 0.081 0.019 0.109
Final income 0.054 0.076 0.071 0.078 0.017 0.106
Source: Own calculations. The indigenous sub-categories are: self (self-identification
of indigenous status); first (respondent declared a native language as the main that
he/she uses); any (respondent declared that he/she can speak at least an indigenous
language; and learned (respondent declared that he/she learned to speak in a native
language).
Figure 4.2: Indigenous GGini for different ethnic classifications
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The first characteristic of this graph is that the fiscal system seems to be working in
the expected direction: as net transfers are added to the market income, the ethnic group
inequality reduces, irrespective of the classification of indigenous status. The GGini is,
however, rather small even in the first stage of the income flow (with no state interven-
tion). This confirms the results of inequality decomposition as shown in Table 4.7.
The second observation is that, assuming that being indigenous represents a disad-
vantage in terms of income distribution, the greatest group-inequality is associated with
the ethno-linguistic definition of native status. Among this, the characteristic of having
learned to speak in a native language (indig learnlang) is the most important, followed
by declaring an indigenous language as the first tongue (indig firstlang). By contrast,
the self-identification (indig) criterion is the less important (lower line) in terms of the
contrast between indigenous and non-indigenous 49. This result could be confirming the
well-known fact that language is an important barrier in terms of the interaction between
minorities and a majority group in the society (Lang, 1986), could produce segregation
effects (Lazear, 1999), and could represent a burden in terms of educational opportunities
(Parker et al., 2005).
Gender inequality
In the case of gender inequality, Figure 4.3 depicts the movement of the group-Gini with
respect to the income concepts. The figure includes a point estimate and confidence inter-
vals that were calculated using a bootstrap procedure (100 repetitions). The interesting
observation here is that not all the state interventions reduced inequality as one would
expect. Particularly, from the disposable income concept to the post-fiscal concept, the
estimated group Gini increases from 0.017 to 0.019. Although marginal, the increase of
group inequality reflects the fact that the indirect taxes component dominates the effect
of the indirect subsidies. The fact that indirect taxes are mostly regressive is well known
in the literature, either for developed economies (Garfinkel et al., 2006; Decoster et al.,
2010) as well for emerging countries (Cabrera et al., 2015; Lustig et al., 2014) and par-
ticularly in the case of Latin America (Lopez-Calva and Lustig, 2010). This evidence
suggests that the tax system in Bolivia is regressive, as its main taxing component relies
on indirect taxes, combined with the negligibility of tax income. It is also surprising that
the impact of net transfers on gender group-inequality is small (0.002), considering that
one of the most important cash transfers is intended for women only (the Bono Juana
Azurduy). This fact calls for a reform of the tax system not only in Bolivia but in Latin
America, that historically have been one of the regions in the world in which the tax
collection is among the lowest (as a percentage of the GDP) as a result of the flawed tax
system (Corbacho et al., 2013).
Location inequality
Finally, Figure 4.4 shows the evolution of the group-Gini coefficient considering location
(rural/urban) alongside the income definitions (reflecting the distinct state interventions,
49Results from the GCov and GTheil (available in the Appendix) confirm that the ethno-linguistic
criteria is the most important when the group-inequality is assessed.
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Figure 4.3: Gender GGini
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as depicted in Figure 4.1). The first impression of the calculations is that this group
inequality represents the largest Gini coefficient of the three categories (0.135 as compared
with 0.09 for indigenous group inequality and 0.019 for gender group inequality). This
would imply that the income differences between individuals living in urban versus rural
areas is the most important type of single group inequality among those groups analyzed
in the chapter. This result is also consistent with the empirical finding of the rural-urban
gap in terms of consumption (Young, 2013), income (Hnatkovska and Lahiri, 2013), health
(van de Poel et al., 2009), and life conditions in general. Rural/urban group inequality
ultimately reflects the degree of marginalization of traditionally disadvantaged groups
(von Braun and Gatzweiler, 2014), revealing the stark dissimilarities in productivity
between traditionally rural sectors (mainly agriculture) with respect to more “urban”
sectors (industry, services, etc.).
The evolution of the urban/rural group inequality with respect to the income con-
cept reflects, however, that the state interventions reduce the income imbalance between
persons from the rural area as compared with the urban area. This reduction, from 0.135
to 0.106 (decrease in 21%), represents the greatest reduction in comparison with the other
two group inequality indicators 50. This could be due to the fact that the incidence of the
tax system (relying in indirect taxes) is more limited in the rural area, as the majority
of business there are informal and not subject to taxes. Therefore, the impact on the
individual consumer is limited, restricting the impact of this component in the locational
group inequality indicator.
50The group inequality regarding the indigenous status (ethno-linguistic criteria) decreases in 15%,
while the gender inequality decreases only in 11%.
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Figure 4.4: Urban/rural GGini
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4.4.3 Intersectionalities
The combination of more than one characteristic in the group categories (gender, in-
digenous status or location) could explain a greater portion of horizontal inequality. For
example, the indigenous condition could imply less opportunities e.g. in joining formal
labor markets, but the condition of being indigenous and live in the rural area could
involve even more discrimination and less economic opportunities. This combination of
categories is coined under the concept of “intersectionality” (Crenshaw, 1991; Lenhardt
and Samman, 2015), and is used to emphasize the greater disadvantage caused by the
membership to more than one traditionally disadvantaged group.
In this sense, in addition to consider group inequalities defined by single categories
(i.e., indigenous, gender, and location), I combine two or more of these characteristics,
and calculate the group Gini corresponding to each of these possibilities: being female
and indigenous; being female and living in the rural area, and being indigenous and living
in the rural area51.
The results of the tax-benefit incidence model reveal that the rural/indigenous com-
bination is the one that involves the greatest degree of disadvantage, from the point of
view of group inequality. The group inequality in this component is smaller than the
sum of the individual group-inequalities (indigenous and rural), but reflects the synergies
of pertaining to more than one traditionally disadvantaged group. As expected, state
intervention in all the income phases’ results in decreasing group inequality (Figure 4.5).
Besides assessing the change in group-Gini coefficients, it would be useful to explore
the inequalities within the distribution (e.g., by decile). For this, I calculate the average
income proportion of the (supposedly) least advantaged group (e.g., being female and
51The definition of being indigenous was given by the ethno-linguistic characteristic of having learned
to speak in a language.
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Figure 4.5: Intersecting inequalities
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indigenous) in terms of the base group (in this case, the income of the male and non-
indigenous), for each income decile. Figure 4.6 shows the result of this exercise.
Figure 4.6: Income proportion of being indigenous and female
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The reference group is: non-indigenous and male.
From Figure 4.6, it can be seen that the market income for the bottom decile of
the female and indigenous represents only a tiny fraction (14%) of the male and whites’
income. In comparison with the top decile, this percentage is 68%. This shows that the
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intersecting categories are in much disadvantage compared to the base categories, and
that the situation is worst in the bottom decile (for the poorest of the poor). The good
news is that, as the state intervenes (via transfers and taxes), this imbalance is partially
corrected: in the bottom-right panel, the income of the poorest female and indigenous
represents 53% of the male whites, while the percentage for the top decile is 69%.
With respect to the combination of rural area and indigenous, the differences are
even greater. Figure 4.7 shows the histograms correspondent to this combination, for each
income decile. The average income for the indigenous living in rural areas in bottom decile
corresponds to only 3% of the reference income (white living in urban areas). In the top
decile, the proportion is 53% and on average it reaches to 28%. The fiscal interventions
seems to balance this stark difference, as the proportion in the bottom decile is similar to
the one at the top decile (bottom-right panel). Again, however, the most disadvantaged
group pre- and post- state intervention are the poorest (bottom decile).
Figure 4.7: Income proportion of being indigenous and living in rural areas
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The reference group is: non-indigenous and urban.
Finally, Figure 4.8 show the proportions of income of women living in rural areas
with respect to the reference group (men living in urban areas). The estimations show
that the income of women living in rural areas (bottom decile) is 11% of men living in
urban areas, in the same decile. This proportion jumps to 44% with the state intervention
of taxes and transfers (bottom-right panel). On the other hand, the proportion for the
top decile without state intervention is 65%, and with state intervention this proportion
increases to 73% of the base group income (men living in urban areas).
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Figure 4.8: Income proportion of women living in rural areas
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The reference group is: male and urban.
4.5 “Indigenousness” index and income inequality
The definition of indigenous status is complex and entail various dimensions, from the
cultural characteristics to the self-identification as pertaining to a native category. One of
the downsides in using a categorical (dummy) variable to define the indigenous status of
an individual is that it tends to oversimplify this multi-dimensional character (McNeish
and Eversole, 2013). In this sense, it would be worth it to explore the use of a synthetic
measure for indigenous status, which incorporates various dimensions in the definition of
this status.
Following Martinez Cobo (1984) and the report of the Permanent Forum on Indige-
nous Issues (2009), the components of a synthetic measure for indigenous status could
be location, language, self-identification, religion and other cultural characteristics. Of
these, location (urban or rural), language and self-identification could be identified using
the EH 2015 household survey52.
As a first step, a synthetic index of “indigenousness” was created based on the men-
tioned variables, applying the Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) methodology
(Wittenberg and Leibbrandt, 2017). The MCA approach has been identified as an alter-
native to the use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) methodology (see e.g. Filmer
and Pritchett, 2001), mainly because its use is more appropriate in the context of cate-
gorical rather than continuous variables (Howe et al., 2008).
Once the indigenousness index was computed, it was normalized to take a range of
values between zero and one, for easier interpretation. Because the index was constructed
52Of the three ethno-linguistic criteria, I use the most relevant: “learned to speak in a native language”.
The combinations using the other two indicators are shown in the appendix.
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based on three variables taking 0-1 values, their values are similar for individuals having
the same characteristics (i.e., a particular value of the index corresponds to an individ-
ual that considers itself indigenous, lives in the rural area, and learned to speak in an
indigenous language).
Figure 4.9 shows a scatterplot of the calculated indigenousness index, against the
average values of the income concepts on each index value. The negative relationship
between the index and all the income concepts is clear. This confirms the earlier finding
in the sense that belonging or being associated with an indigenous status entails less
income. This relationship is systematically observed alongside all the income concepts,
and reinforces the idea of the great income discrepancies with respect to the indigenous
origin/character of the individual. In addition, with high values of the index the income
is homogeneously low, and the opposite is also true for low values of the index (high
disposable income). More variability is observed around the average index, meaning that
the middle class could be more “blended”, in terms of self-identification, location and
language.
As observed in Figure 4.9, the slope of the fitted curve tends to be slightly steeper
with the successive state intervention (represented by the consecutive income concepts):
this confirms the result of the positive impact of government intervention in reducing the
ethnic income gap (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.9: Indigenousness index and income concepts
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4.6 Sensitivity analysis
In order to verify the sensitivity of the main results to the chosen parameters, some
modifications are applied to certain parameters of the tax-benefit incidence model. These
parameters are: the indirect taxes’ rates and the subsidy rates for gasoline and cooking
fuel. Both parameters will affect to the post-fiscal income, as depicted in Figure 4.1, so
the changes are observed only in this stage of the income concept flow.
4.6.1 Indirect taxes’ rates
One of the assumptions for the incorporation of indirect taxes in the model was the
adoption of the incidence rates as shown in Table 4.3, estimated by Cossio (2001). An
additional assumption was that the incidence in the rural area was lower, due to the
predominance of informality in this area. Instead, I assume that incidence in the rural
area is 0.5, 0.75 and 1 successively, instead of the initial rate of 0.3. By assuming an
incidence of 1 in the rural area, I assume that there is no difference between urban and
rural areas with respect to the influence of indirect taxes. Results of this sensitivity check
are provided in Table 4.9 and shown graphically in Figure 4.10.
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Table 4.9: Sensitivity check, indirect taxes
Indigenous GGinia Gender GGini Location GGini
Incidenceb 13
1
2
3
4 1
1
3
1
2
3
4 1
1
3
1
2
3
4 1
Market 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135
Disposable 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129
Post-fiscal 0.081 0.083 0.085 0.088 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.109 0.114 0.122 0.130
Final 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106
Source: Own calculations. The incidence row is referred to the proportion of the indirect tax incidence assumed for the
rural areas.
a For the calculation of the indigenous GGini, it was assumed that the relevant grouping category was based on the
“learned to speak in a native language” characteristic.
b The original proportion in the main estimations was 13 .
Figure 4.10: Sensitivity check, indirect taxes
Incidence(‡) ⅓ ½ ¾ 1 ⅓ ½ ¾ 1 ⅓ ½ ¾ 1
Market 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135
Disposable 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129
Post-fiscal 0.081 0.083 0.085 0.088 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.109 0.114 0.122 0.130
Final 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106
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From the results shown in Table 4.9 and depicted in Figure 4.10, it can be seen
that the increase of the indirect tax incidence in the rural area has a negative effect
on the indigenous and the location (urban/rural) group-Gini (that is, it increases the
group inequality). The increase is 4.9% when tax incidence changes from 0.33 to 0.5;
12.3% (when incidence is 0.75); and 19.8% when the same incidence is assumed both in
urban and rural areas. In the same way, the indigenous group inequality increases as
the incidence rises, because most of the indigenous people lives in the rural area53: the
jumps are 2%, 4.9%, and 8%, from the base incidence of 0.33 to the same incidence as
in the urban area. The sensitivity of the GGini to the indirect taxes incidence implies
that, when an equal share is assumed between urban and rural areas (corresponding to
the last column of each group category in Table 4.9), the impact of the indirect tax turns
to be regressive.
The result of the exercise implies that gender group inequality decreases when the
rural tax incidence increases. Although the decrease is very reduced in comparison to
the change of the other GGinis54, this could be because less women live and/or work in
the rural area in comparison to those in the urban area. However, despite the different
incidence rates of the indirect taxes in the rural area, their impact still is associated with
an increase of the gender group inequality, proving the regressive nature of this type of
tax, and the urge to reform the fiscal system.
4.6.2 Subsidy rate
The next sensitivity check consists in the modification of the subsidy rate for gasoline and
cooking fuel. In the main estimations, it was assumed that subsidy rate for each of them
was 50%, based on official figures. Here, I assume instead that the subsidy is sequentially
reduced (25%) and eliminated (0%), for both fuels. The results of the exercise are shown
on Table 4.10 and depicted in Figure 4.11. Unlike the results from the change in the
incidence of indirect taxes, reducing and eliminating the fuel subsidies have a smaller
impact in the group inequality, with respect to the three grouping categories, perhaps
because the incidence of this expenditure is small in comparison with other spending
categories (e.g., food or clothes). The change in the GGini for indigenous status and in
the location GGini (urban/rural) is indistinguishable, as Figure 4.11 shows. The change
in the gender GGini is the most discernible, although the effect of indirect taxes remains
to be regressive, confirming this undesirable characteristic of the tax system in Bolivia.
53According to the 2015 household survey, 63% of the self-declared indigenous people live in the rural
area.
54The decrease goes from -0.7% to -3% when the incidence of the indirect tax in the rural area is
increased.
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Table 4.10: Sensitivity check, subsidies rate
Indigenous GGinia Gender GGini Location GGini
Subsidy rateb 50% 25% 0% 50% 25% 0% 50% 25% 0%
Market 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.135 0.135 0.135
Disposable 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.129 0.129 0.129
Post-fiscal 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.109 0.109 0.110
Final 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.106 0.106 0.106
Source: Own calculations. The subsidy row is referred to the different subsidy rates applied.
a For the calculation of the indigenous GGini, it was assumed that the relevant grouping category
was based on the “learned to speak in a native language” characteristic.
b The original subsidy rate in the main estimations was 50%.
Figure 4.11: Sensitivity check, subsidies rate
Subsidy rate 50% 25% 0% 50% 25% 0% 50% 25% 0%
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Final 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.106 0.106 0.106
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4.7 Conclusions
The analysis of group inequality is relevant in contexts in which large segments of popula-
tion have been historically excluded or marginalized. Being the country with the highest
proportion of indigenous people in Latin America, the role of the state in reducing hori-
zontal inequalities in Bolivia is worthwhile to examine. Existing research does not offer
sufficient evidence of fiscal policy’s effect over group inequality.
In this study, I evaluate the impact of the fiscal policy (system of taxes and trans-
fers) in closing the ethnic, gender and urban/rural income gap. The results shows that
the adoption of an ethno-linguistic criterion implies a greater income group-inequality.
Within the ethno-linguistic components, the most relevant is if the individual learned
to talk in a native language. This characteristic determines the biggest “shortcoming”
regarding income distribution. Despite this, and according to the results, the government
intervention seemed to reduce the income inequality associated with a native origin, as
well as the inequality due to urban/rural location. The reduction due to government in-
tervention is however very limited due to the small size of the transfers, leakages, absence
of targeting, and the regressive character of the tax system. These characteristics have
been also recognized as limiting factors in reducing (vertical) inequality in other study
cases (for Guatemala, see Lustig, 2017; Paz Arauco et al., 2014 addresses the case of
Bolivia).
Considering gender inequality, the relevant feature was that the state intervention
(in form of net transfers) increases inequality in the transition from disposable income
to post-fiscal income. This could be an indication of the failure of the tax system, which
relies mostly in indirect taxes, rather than in direct taxes (e.g., an income tax) that are
yet to be implemented in the country.
With respect to the other grouping indicators, the rural/urban component is the
characteristic with the most income horizontal inequality. The imbalance could be due
most probably to the difference in productivity of activities traditionally linked to the
rural area (i.e., agriculture), in comparison with the more diverse activities in the urban
area (industry, services, etc.).
I also explore the intersecting income inequalities, or the overlap of more than one
category of the analyzed groups. The results imply that the indigenous living in the rural
area are the most disadvantaged category of the three considered (female and indigenous,
and female living in rural areas). This result is consistent with the individual results
with respect to single group-inequalities. In addition, the issue of “indigenousness” is
explored using an index that tries to synthesize the indigenous condition, based on certain
characteristics (language, self-identification, and location) that are linked to this status.
The results imply that, on average, a continuous variable reflecting “indigenousness” is
negatively related with income, confirming the previous results.
The policy implications of the findings call for a better design of the transfers and
taxing system. The fact that the cash transfers have a universal character, imply that
there will always the risk of leakage, and that the people who need them least will end up
benefiting from them the most. In addition, indirect taxes could cause the dilution of the
positive effect of cash transfers on income. Even worse, the indirect taxes affect mostly
to the poor (given its regressive nature). Policymakers need to fix the fiscal system for
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it to bring sustainable effects on poverty and inequality reduction. In addition to this,
policy interventions should aim to preserve and encourage the use of native languages
from early childhood (Martinez, 2017), and facilitating their use in important sectors as
health through trained translators (Laitin and Ramachandran, 2016) to avoid barriers in
its provision.
Future directions for research could include the exploration of a behavioral tax-
benefit incidence model, in which the change of the parameters (as the subsidy and tax
rates) imply modifications in the decisions of the affected economic agents. In addition,
the temporal dimension of the analysis could be also examined, allowing the analysis of
a long-term impact of the fiscal system on inequality or poverty indicators.
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CHAPTER
FIVE
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND POTENTIAL POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
The chapters of this dissertation analyzed three different interventions from the public
sector to tackle poverty and inequality. Despite of the acknowledged important reduc-
tion of poverty and inequality in Bolivia in the last 10 years, the evidence about the
effectiveness of public sector intervention is mixed.
The first chapter analyzed the change from a sizable yearly lump sum transfer to a
much smaller monthly installment. This exogenous policy change allowed to disentangle
the potential consequences on the behavior of economic agents when faced with this
apparently simple change. The relatively recent acknowledgment of behavioral limitations
in development-related interventions motivated the analysis of this policy change. This
modification might had important consequences, if we take into account the limiting role
of certain behavioral characteristics as the lack of commitment, propensity to spend, and
inability to save. Because its importance in human capital formation, we were interested
in the impact that this policy change could had on education, and on child labor. Our
results showed that the policy change increased the schooling attendance rate in the
secondary cohort (12-18 years old), and reduced child labor, in the same age cohort.
This result is consistent when considering some robustness checks. A limitation of the
present study, however, is that it focuses on the “quantity” of education (attendance),
but it does not explore the effects of cash transfers’ design in the quality of education.
The information requirements for this type of evaluation are greater, but the topic would
be certainly worth to be explored more in depth in the future.
The policy implications lessons’ regarding this exogenous change might be potentially
useful and informative for policymakers. Cash transfers are widely used as a tool for
social protection especially in developing countries, and vast research has consistently
shown positive results regarding a variety of outcomes. This in turn would allow to break
the inter-generational cycle of poverty. However, consistent evidence is missing with
respect to the design of such programs, for example with respect to timing, size, and
conditionality. The chapter showed that characteristics as stability, regularity, certainty,
and a greater frequency of payments might be desirable, to keep young people in school.
This small variation might prove to be especially relevant in the Latin American region,
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in which almost 18 million of young people between 15-24 years abandon the school
(de Hoyos et al., 2016), without a sustainable insertion in the labor market.
The second chapter of the dissertation addresses another aspect of human capital
formation (health), and a different dimension of governmental transfers. There is a belief
that decentralization policy, given that allows the government to be “closer to the peo-
ple”, automatically entail an increase in people’s welfare. Among the possibilities are:
a better local service delivery; the increase of monitoring the provision of public goods;
and/or the improvement of the allocation and management of local resources. However,
the evidence with respect to the impact of decentralization on intermediate and final
outcomes is not conclusive. We assess the impact of a significant increase of national
revenues in the 2000s decade in Bolivia (which in turn had to be redistributed to the
local governments) to analyze its consequences on public service delivery (an interme-
diate goal), and child nutrition (a final outcome). The results showed a limited impact
of increased fiscal decentralization, no improvement on access to safe water and sanita-
tion, and a weak impact on nutrition indicators (with the most benefit corresponding to
the non-poor municipalities). At the same time, we detected an interaction component
between decentralization dimensions (fiscal, political, and administrative). It would be
worth to explore these complementarities more in depth, through studies exploiting ex-
ogenous policy changes, or through the design of experiments or trials that allow to shed
light into the issue of how to improve the public management, especially at the local
government level.
The room for improvement of decentralization policy in Bolivia is ample. The coun-
try needs to go beyond the remarkable change of responsibilities and resources that have
taken place more than two decades ago in the decentralization reform in Bolivia, to incor-
porate an institutional development perspective at the local level, through improvements
in the governance processes and the specialization and training of local human resources.
Another set of recommendations lies in the generation of own revenues of the local gov-
ernments. The limitations of own-revenues’ collection of the municipal governments pose
problems akin to moral hazard-type issues: if the local government receives the lion’s
share of their revenues from the central government, they might not be careful or wise
when spending or investing these resources. The results shown here seem to go in this
direction.
Finally, the third chapter aimed at evaluating the government intervention on the
reduction of existing income inequalities in important social groups in the society (in
specific, indigenous people, female and population living in rural areas). Through the
use of a tax-benefit incidence analysis, we showed that the greatest group-inequality is
observed when the indigenous status is defined using an ethno-linguistic metric. However,
the role of self-identification in determining the indigenous status is less important in
explaining the income gap. In addition, locational inequality (urban/rural) is the highest
of the three inequality measures analyzed, which reveals the great disparities between
urban and rural areas in Bolivia in particular, and in development countries in general.
The differential of living status, educational opportunities and productivity between rural
and urban areas could explain the greater degree of inequality in comparison with more-
developed urban areas. With respect to the gender inequality, the state intervention
proved to be counterproductive at some point in the taxes-and-benefits flow. This is
95
most probably because of the characteristics of the tax system in Bolivia, which mainly
relies on indirect (regressive) taxes rather than a personal income tax. The overlapping
categories (e.g., indigenous and woman) imply clearly the greatest disadvantage in terms
of income distribution, and constitute a vulnerable group that should be subject of social
protection, e.g. through cash transfers. However, the presence of a regressive tax system
and the lack of targeting limits the effectiveness of the social protection system.
One branch of potential policy recommendations about these findings deals with the
degree of progressiveness of the tax system. The existing indirect tax scheme needs to
be complemented with a proper income tax, which is currently not present. In addition,
the system of cash and in-kind transfers needs a targeting scheme rather than being
universal. However, the targeting process is difficult in essence, due to the problem of
an accurate identification of those in most need of social protection. Means-test based
transfers are imperfect and costly, and can be subject to significant leakages. Some
innovations in the area include the use of satellite data to gather information about
the quality of housing (in specific, the material of the roof) in order to better target
the cash transfers (Abelson et al., 2014), the adoption of Community-Based-Targeting
(Alatas et al., 2012), and the role of self-selection (Alatas et al., 2016). The other set
of recommendations lie in the use and preservation of indigenous languages in countries
such as Bolivia, which are still used by a great proportion of the population nowadays.
Research has shown that early adoption of indigenous languages in primary education can
contribute to greater cognitive development, improved attention, and improved levels of
abstract and symbolic representation (Adesope et al., 2010). Even though in Bolivia the
preservation of indigenous languages at school and at other instances have been boosted
by the government in recent years, there is still much room for improvement to make the
most of the use of multiple languages in a multicultural context.
The corollary of these three stories is that monetary resources are not a sufficient
condition to achieve a sustainable reduction of poverty and inequality. A second gener-
ation of reforms entail a lot more than only the transference of money from the state,
be it to individual economic agents in form of cash transfers, or to local governments via
fiscal decentralization. This reform should address the development of local institutions,
the reform of the tax system, and the improvement of education quality, among many
other topics in the agenda. For this, the government will need to deal with more complex
problems that require carefully-thought solutions, adequate planning, and results-based
evidence.
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Table A1: Complete results for attendance
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment*y2008 0.017 0.014 0.014
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Treatment −0.012 −0.001 −0.001
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
y2008 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Native proxy 0.009 0.009
(0.006) (0.006)
Female 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
nat fem −0.001 −0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Private school −0.013∗ −0.013∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Age −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
First born proxy −0.001 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Number school aged HH members −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Rural household −0.000 −0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
Head is employed −0.019∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Native household head proxy 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Age of the household head 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
age hhead2 −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Household head is female −0.002 −0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Household head has college studies 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Log of durable goods value 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Log of monthly food expenditure 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
cons 0.984∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.032) (0.032)
Region No No Yes
Covariates No Yes Yes
Observations 8,887 8,818 8,818
R2 0.001 0.021 0.021
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2: Cohort results for attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Treatment*y2008 0.007 0.021 0.007 0.019 0.007 0.019
(0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.018)
Treatment −0.003 −0.015 −0.003 0.002 −0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.015)
y2008 −0.002 0.010∗ −0.003 0.011∗∗ −0.003 0.011∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Native proxy 0.013∗∗∗ 0.004 0.013∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010)
Female 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
nat fem −0.005 0.002 −0.005 0.002
(0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010)
Private school −0.000 −0.022∗ −0.000 −0.022∗
(0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.011)
Age −0.000 −0.010∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
First born proxy −0.001 0.004 −0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Number school aged HH members −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Rural household 0.000 −0.002 0.000 −0.002
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
Head is employed −0.000 −0.035∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.035∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009)
Native household head proxy −0.004 0.008 −0.004 0.008
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Age of the household head 0.000 0.005∗∗∗ 0.000 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
age hhead2 −0.000 −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household head is female 0.000 −0.002 0.000 −0.002
(0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007)
Household head has college studies 0.001 0.019∗∗ 0.001 0.019∗∗
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008)
Log of durable goods value 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Log of monthly food expenditure 0.004 −0.001 0.004 −0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
cons 0.997∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.040) (0.057) (0.040) (0.057)
Region No No No No Yes Yes
Covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,433 4,454 4,432 4,386 4,432 4,386
R2 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.024 0.007 0.024
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A3: Complete results for child labor
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment*y2008 −0.037 −0.032 −0.032
(0.049) (0.040) (0.040)
Treatment 0.001 −0.009 −0.009
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
y2008 0.051∗ −0.009 −0.009
(0.027) (0.018) (0.018)
Native proxy 0.191∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031)
Female −0.049∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
nat fem −0.001 −0.001
(0.024) (0.024)
Private school −0.042∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Age 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
First born proxy 0.003 0.003
(0.009) (0.009)
Number school aged HH members 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
Rural household 0.332∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027)
Head is employed 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016)
Native household head proxy 0.032∗ 0.032∗
(0.018) (0.018)
Age of the household head 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
age hhead2 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Household head is female 0.015 0.015
(0.014) (0.014)
Household head has college studies −0.038∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Log of durable goods value −0.005 −0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Log of monthly food expenditure −0.036∗∗ −0.036∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
cons 0.289∗∗∗ −0.055 −0.055
(0.018) (0.117) (0.117)
Region No No Yes
Covariates No Yes Yes
Observations 8,933 8,176 8,176
R2 0.003 0.329 0.329
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4: Cohort results for child labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Treatment*y2008 0.007 −0.053 0.029 −0.081 0.029 −0.081
(0.055) (0.061) (0.045) (0.050) (0.045) (0.050)
Treatment −0.025 0.003 −0.026 −0.000 −0.026 −0.000
(0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
y2008 0.041 0.057∗∗ −0.021 −0.002 −0.021 −0.002
(0.032) (0.028) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
Native proxy 0.232∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.035) (0.039) (0.035)
Female −0.016 −0.078∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.078∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014)
nat fem −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033)
Private school −0.001 −0.061∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.061∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016)
Age 0.029∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
First born proxy −0.004 0.004 −0.004 0.004
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Number school aged HH members −0.000 0.009 −0.000 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Rural household 0.300∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
Head is employed 0.064∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Native household head proxy 0.021 0.044∗∗ 0.021 0.044∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Age of the household head 0.009∗∗ −0.005 0.009∗∗ −0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
age hhead2 −0.000∗ 0.000 −0.000∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household head is female −0.007 0.033∗∗ −0.007 0.033∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Household head has college studies −0.021 −0.049∗∗∗ −0.021 −0.049∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019)
Log of durable goods value 0.000 −0.010∗∗ 0.000 −0.010∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Log of monthly food expenditure −0.051∗∗∗ −0.021 −0.051∗∗∗ −0.021
(0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016)
cons 0.215∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ −0.116 −0.003 −0.116 −0.003
(0.020) (0.019) (0.148) (0.137) (0.148) (0.137)
Region No No No No Yes Yes
Covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,829 5,104 3,790 4,386 3,790 4,386
R2 0.003 0.003 0.345 0.318 0.345 0.318
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A5: Falsification test 2006-2007:attendance
(1) (2) (3)
Primary Secondary Whole sample
Treatment*y2007 −0.004 −0.016 −0.011
(0.008) (0.019) (0.012)
Treatment 0.002 0.013 0.008
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
y2007 0.003 −0.015∗∗ −0.005∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
nat prox 0.006 0.004 0.005
(0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
female 0.004 0.006 0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
nat fem −0.004 0.003 −0.001
(0.004) (0.012) (0.006)
priv school 0.004∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.007
(0.002) (0.009) (0.005)
age −0.000 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
child ord== 1.0000 −0.001 −0.005 −0.007∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
schoolaged 0.001 −0.003 −0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
rural 0.004 −0.004 0.002
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
empl hhead −0.004 −0.027∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
nat hhead −0.003 0.001 −0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
age hhead −0.000 0.002∗ 0.001∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
age hhead2 0.000 −0.000∗ −0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
fem hhead −0.004 −0.001 −0.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
sup hhead 0.004∗∗ 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.007) (0.004)
lgdur 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
lgfoodexp −0.002 0.015∗∗ 0.006∗
(0.002) (0.007) (0.004)
chuquisaca 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
la paz −0.003 0.026∗∗ 0.010∗
(0.004) (0.011) (0.005)
cochabamba −0.003 0.009 0.001
(0.003) (0.013) (0.006)
oruro 0.002 0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.015) (0.007)
potosi 0.001 0.009 0.003
(0.002) (0.014) (0.006)
tarija −0.004 0.004 −0.001
(0.004) (0.015) (0.007)
santa cruz −0.001 −0.016 −0.010
(0.003) (0.015) (0.007)
beni −0.011 −0.019 −0.017∗
(0.009) (0.017) (0.009)
pando −0.005 −0.009 −0.008
(0.006) (0.022) (0.010)
cons 1.004∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.052) (0.026)
Region Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,866 4,788 9,654
R2 0.010 0.028 0.022
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A6: Falsification test 2006-2007:child labor
(1) (2) (3)
Primary Secondary Whole sample
Treatment*y2007 −0.009 −0.015 −0.009
(0.059) (0.048) (0.042)
Treatment −0.021 −0.001 −0.010
(0.054) (0.041) (0.038)
y2007 0.036∗ 0.034∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
nat prox 0.233∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.036) (0.030)
female −0.023∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009)
nat fem −0.019 0.031 0.006
(0.034) (0.036) (0.027)
priv school −0.018 −0.038∗∗ −0.034∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.013)
age 0.029∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
child ord== 1.0000 −0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009)
schoolaged 0.002 0.015∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
rural 0.296∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.025)
empl hhead 0.053∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.022) (0.017)
nat hhead −0.002 0.038∗ 0.020
(0.018) (0.021) (0.016)
age hhead 0.007∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
age hhead2 −0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
fem hhead −0.000 0.013 0.008
(0.017) (0.016) (0.013)
sup hhead −0.028∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.014)
lgdur −0.002 −0.011∗∗∗ −0.007∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
lgfoodexp −0.007 −0.004 −0.007
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013)
chuquisaca 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
la paz 0.102∗∗∗ 0.012 0.056∗
(0.037) (0.031) (0.030)
cochabamba 0.022 0.020 0.025
(0.042) (0.034) (0.033)
oruro 0.028 −0.026 0.001
(0.041) (0.033) (0.031)
potosi 0.076∗ 0.012 0.047
(0.041) (0.043) (0.035)
tarija 0.159∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.037) (0.036)
santa cruz 0.036 0.072∗∗ 0.060∗
(0.036) (0.035) (0.031)
beni 0.016 0.052 0.039
(0.042) (0.037) (0.034)
pando −0.103∗ −0.123∗∗ −0.110∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.058)
cons −0.423∗∗∗ −0.069 −0.222∗∗
(0.109) (0.143) (0.104)
Region Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,091 4,788 8,879
R2 0.315 0.263 0.283
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A7: Falsification test 2008-2009:attendance
(1) (2) (3)
Primary Secondary Whole sample
Treatment*y2009 0.000 −0.012 −0.006
(0.002) (0.016) (0.008)
Treatment 0.004∗∗ 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.011) (0.006)
y2009 −0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
nat prox 0.007∗ −0.007 0.000
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005)
female −0.001 −0.000 −0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
nat fem −0.004 0.003 −0.001
(0.004) (0.010) (0.005)
priv school −0.005 −0.013 −0.010∗
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
age −0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
child ord== 1.0000 −0.004 −0.002 −0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
schoolaged −0.001 0.003∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
schoolaged 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
rural −0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
empl hhead −0.002 −0.015∗∗ −0.009∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
nat hhead 0.000 −0.005 −0.002
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
age hhead −0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
age hhead2 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
fem hhead −0.002 −0.001 −0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
sup hhead −0.000 0.018∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
lgdur 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
lgfoodexp 0.006 −0.007 −0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
depto=1 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
depto=2 −0.003 −0.005 −0.005∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
depto=3 −0.012∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
depto=4 −0.005 −0.003 −0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
depto=5 −0.003 −0.006 −0.005∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
depto=6 −0.001 −0.005 −0.003
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
depto=7 −0.009 −0.025∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
depto=8 −0.009 −0.007 −0.008
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
depto=9 −0.005 −0.001 −0.004
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
cons 0.969∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.043) (0.028)
Region Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,281 4,144 8,425
R2 0.008 0.016 0.012
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A8: Falsification test 2008-2009:child labor
(1) (2) (3)
Primary Secondary Whole sample
Treatment*y2009 0.058 0.100∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.051) (0.054) (0.041)
Treatment −0.015 −0.069 −0.043
(0.043) (0.043) (0.034)
y2009 −0.044∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
nat prox 0.234∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.037) (0.030)
female −0.009 −0.048∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.009)
nat fem −0.049 −0.077∗∗ −0.061∗∗
(0.031) (0.034) (0.024)
priv school 0.000 −0.075∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.014)
age 0.030∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
child ord== 1.0000 −0.011 0.009 0.001
(0.014) (0.014) (0.009)
schoolaged −0.008 0.007 0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
schoolaged 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
rural 0.220∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.029) (0.023)
empl hhead 0.093∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.028) (0.021)
nat hhead 0.015 0.069∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗
(0.020) (0.023) (0.017)
age hhead 0.005 −0.007 −0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
age hhead2 −0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
fem hhead 0.016 0.068∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.015)
sup hhead −0.028 −0.045∗∗ −0.037∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.016)
lgdur −0.008∗ −0.002 −0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
lgfoodexp 0.006 −0.003 0.000
(0.019) (0.015) (0.013)
depto=1 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
depto=2 −0.069 0.027 −0.027
(0.060) (0.050) (0.053)
depto=3 −0.145∗∗ 0.037 −0.060
(0.062) (0.053) (0.054)
depto=4 −0.161∗∗ −0.002 −0.084
(0.065) (0.064) (0.059)
depto=5 0.013 0.031 0.013
(0.065) (0.058) (0.059)
depto=6 −0.244∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.058) (0.058)
depto=7 −0.164∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.095∗
(0.060) (0.050) (0.053)
depto=8 −0.203∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.094
(0.065) (0.065) (0.064)
depto=9 −0.273∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.072) (0.083)
cons −0.273 −0.096 −0.167
(0.175) (0.137) (0.120)
Region Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,641 4,146 7,787
R2 0.319 0.266 0.287
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B1: Group-coefficient of variation (GCOV)
Indigenous Gender Location
Self First Any Learned
Market income 0.147 0.226 0.158 0.211 0.037 0.289
Disposable income 0.137 0.210 0.145 0.196 0.036 0.276
Post-fiscal income 0.126 0.200 0.134 0.185 0.038 0.233
Final income 0.120 0.192 0.128 0.178 0.034 0.228
Source: Own calculations. The indigenous sub-categories are: self (self-identification
of indigenous status); first (respondent declared a native language as the main that
he/she uses); any (respondent declared that he/she can speak at least an indigenous
language; and learned (respondent declared that he/she learned to speak in a native
language).
Table B2: Group-Theil coefficient (GTheil)
Indigenous Gender Location
Self First Any Learned
Market income 0.012 0.031 0.013 0.025 0.001 0.046
Disposable income 0.010 0.026 0.011 0.022 0.001 0.042
Post-fiscal income 0.008 0.024 0.009 0.019 0.001 0.029
Final income 0.008 0.022 0.008 0.018 0.001 0.028
Source: Own calculations. The indigenous sub-categories are: self (self-identification
of indigenous status); first (respondent declared a native language as the main that
he/she uses); any (respondent declared that he/she can speak at least an indigenous
language; and learned (respondent declared that he/she learned to speak in a native
language).
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Figure B.1: Indigenousness index and income concepts. Alternative 1, first indigenous
language
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Source: Own calculations. In each of the four panels, the “indigenousness”
index is plotted in the horizontal axis, and average income (in Bs.) in the
vertical axis. The fitted line was estimated using OLS.
Figure B.2: Indigenousness index and income concepts. Alternative 2, any indigenous
language
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Source: Own calculations. In each of the four panels, the “indigenousness”
index is plotted in the horizontal axis, and average income (in Bs.) in the
vertical axis. The fitted line was estimated using OLS.
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